The Non-Considered Problem

One last quick comment regarding the Non-Identity Problem.
Probably the most familiar and common example being used to explain the platform which the non-identity problem emerges from, is Parfit’s case of a fourteen-year-old girl who decides to create a person, an example I have specified in the second part. But there is another common example, one from the environmental domain, which I find important to shortly address.

The common intuition is that polluting the environment and lavishly consuming “natural resources” is harmful towards future people. But according to the logical inferences derived from the non-identity problem, since the people who would be harmed in the future by existing people polluting and wasting the environment in the present, wouldn’t exist if present people decide to stop polluting the environment and lavishly consume “natural resources” (because environmental policies have effects on people’s behaviors, habits, location, workplaces and etc., which would also affect when and with whom they procreate and as a consequence affect the identity of the procreated), as long as the future people in the trashed environment would have a life worth living, supposedly no one is harmed by currently existing people polluting the environment and lavishly consuming “natural resources”.
In other words, the non-identity problem raises the question: considering that different environmental policies affect the identity of future people, as long as the lives of the future people who would exist as a consequence of any level of environmental policy, including the most negligent one, are worth living, who is harmed by environmental negligence? Its logical inference is that none of it is harming anyone. According to the logic of the non-identity problem as long as the environmental policies performed today don’t result in future people having lives not worth living, all environmental policies are unharmful, and not wrong, as who are their victims?

To not repeat the arguments regarding harms and harming (including harming future people in spite of the non-identity problem), which I have broadly discussed in the three previous parts about the non-identity problem, as well as in the text about Seana Shiffrin’s prominent and outstanding article Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm, I’ll just point out that there certainly are identified specific victims of polluting the environment and lavishly consuming “natural resources”, and these are of course each and every currently existing sentient creature on earth. There is everything wrong with environmental negligence, it is extremely harmful, and its victims are trillions of identified specific sentient creatures living in and off the environment. These are the main victims of pollution and “resources” depletion as it is, and if the non-identity problem would be taken seriously in an environmental context (which practically gives permission to pollute even more), it would make their lives even worse. Only an extremely super-speciesist perspective can ignore all the harms done to all these individuals, undoubtedly the vast majority of sentient creatures on earth.

The answer to the question who is harmed by polluting the environment and lavishly consuming “natural resources”, is as always, first and foremost, the most vulnerable and defenseless creatures on the planet. These are the ones who are highly affected by every human action and are constantly harmed by each and every human activity. They are always the most numerous victims, and always the ones who are harmed most severely. Therefore they are the ones who must be in the center of every ethical thought, and yet they are rarely considered at all.
Currently, reasoning, even in the ethical sphere, is so speciesist that a pseudo sophisticated problem such as who is harmed by pollution and resources depletion given that the ones who would exist as a consequence of it would actually benefit from that, can be seriously discussed while totally ignoring the trillions of sentient creatures who as a consequence would be even more severely harmed than they already are.

The Non-Identity Problem – Part 3 – Every Imaginable Abuse

The following is the third and last part of a text about the Non-Identity Problem and its relation to Antinatalism. If you haven’t read the first and second parts please do so before reading this one.

For those who have read the previous parts here is a very short reminder of the non-identity problem.
The Non-Identity Problem points at a paradox regarding harming future individuals.
Derek Parfit, the philosopher behind this claim, argues that despite the intuition that it is wrong to create a person in the case of what is considered to be severe congenital impairments, or in the case of what is considered to be an impaired environmental starting point, actually, as long as that person would have a life considered to be worth living overall, that person couldn’t be regarded as a victim of the impairments, or to even be harmed by them, since preventing them necessarily means that that person wouldn’t exist at all and so wouldn’t have what is considered as an overall worth living life.

In this post I’ll address the third main notion implied by the non-identity problem.

Every Imaginable Abuse

The third notion implied by the Non-Identity Problem undermines the intuition that the referred lives are indeed always wrong and harmful. As even in the cases of extreme impairments, as long as the person created is having a life considered to be overall worth living, there is no one we can point at as being wronged or harmed.

If this notion is right it means that as long as the children don’t prefer never to have existed, their parents can enslave them, abuse them, neglect them, molest them, and etc., and not only that the parents don’t harm their children according to the non-identity logic, but their children were actually benefited (since otherwise these children wouldn’t have existed, the only way these specific children could exist is as salves or as abused children).

It means that any case of negligence by the parents, the gynecologist who performed the tests to examine whether there are expected disease or health issues, all the doctors who were involved in the pregnancy, the ultrasound technicians and etc., don’t harm a person no matter what their contribution to its impairments is, as long as the created person has a life considered to be worth living overall.

This approach can be taken to absurd examples like a sadistic scientist who deliberately creates a person with every possible disease and impairment possible, just for his sick sake of watching people suffer. According to the Non-Identity Problem approach, as long as that person has nevertheless a life worth living (please ignore, for the sake of the argument, how implausible this option is), the sadistic scientist has not harmed that person.

To suggest that procreation is harmful if and only if the created person would prefer not to exist, is an unacceptable criterion in any other aspect of life. In workplaces for example, the criterion for unethical working environment can’t be based on what would make people quit their jobs. It can’t be that the ethical criterion would be that as long as someone puts up with any harm forced on it, then it is not wrong. Sexual harassments are always wrong and harmful, they don’t become harmless if the harassed person prefers to endure it over losing a job. It reminds me of the notorious pro-natalist claim ‘well if you don’t like life you can always commit suicide’. Most people can’t always carry out suicide, it is never simple and easy, and it always has a tremendous cost. But the point here is that this logic permits any harm as long as it is below the threshold, and the threshold is what would make the harmed person prefer never to have existed.

The claim that no matter how horrible a person’s impairments are, as long as overall that person’s life is considered worth living that person is not harmed – is cruel and exploitative. It is cruel because it forces horrible lives on people who don’t have alternatives, and it is exploitative since the parents are actually getting a moral license to take advantage of the addictive aspect of life and treat their children as they wish. They know that their children would probably adapt to their shitty lives, or at least, as explained in the second part, won’t think that they better never to have existed since they are afraid of the alternative, and since they are biologically and socially structured to favor life, it is ok to force them into a miserable life.

As mentioned in the second part, to argue that it is not wrong to create an impaired person as long as its life is above the threshold, requires thinking that existence is good in itself. According to this logic, people should create as many people as possible, no matter how awful their lives would be as long as they are above the threshold. If existence is a benefit, why are we not compelled to create as many people as possible? Why are people not obligated to create as many people as they can, and by that I don’t mean to the point that they can no longer support them (as according to the non-identity reasoning it is not wrong to sell them or financially exploit them as long as their lives are worth living), but as many as their biological limit is?

In a way, despite that seemingly the non-identity problem weakens the claim against creating people with severe impairments, it actually strengthens the claim against all procreations. The difficulty that the non-identity problem creates is with opposing causing someone harms when that someone has a life considered to be worth living overall. Allegedly, we are supposed to accept the harm and allow the parents to cause it and exempt them from taking responsibility. And this problem is even greater since it is supposed to apply to other cases as well in which someone is forced into a harmful and unnecessary situation without consent but that person prefers the overall outcome, cases which are intuitively unethical, but are ethical according to the logic of the non-identity problem, as who is the victim?
Rejecting this claim and accepting any harm forced on someone as long as s/he prefers its existence, and as long as its existence is depended upon that harm, can result in very harmful scenarios that few would be ready to accept.
One of them is of abusing or negligent parents. The children of abusive or negligent parents might prefer their existence over never existing, but does it make their abuse and neglect not at all a harm?!
Another example often given in that context is slavery. Is creating a person with the intent of enslavement, not harming that person if that person prefers its existence over non-existence?

If we think that it is harmful despite that allegedly there is no victim in these cases, then clearly every procreation is morally wrong as breeding is always harming with no consent, it is always putting another person at risk such as that the created person would be abused or neglected, or enslaved, and since breeding is never necessary.
Isn’t objecting cases such as domestic abuse, neglect, or slavery, but not others, mostly a case of volume and rhetoric? An ethical argument should be based on a principle not on volume and rhetoric. I am not comparing abusive parents or slavery to any case of procreation of course. Despite that I think that every procreation is morally wrong I don’t think that all are equally wrong. But the principle must apply to all cases. They are all wrong, and abuse and slavery are simply worse cases. My point here in the context of the non-identity problem is that it reveals how the opposition to cases such as abuse and slavery when there is seemingly no person to point at as their victim rests on shaky ground. It can’t be that the claim is ‘that is way over the line!’ An extreme harm makes an ethical problem an extreme ethical problem but it doesn’t constitute the immorality of the case. If the criterion is life worth living, especially if it is in the eyes of the person living it, then every case, even the most extreme, is not unethical as long as it is preferable by its victim. To be consistent with the conclusions derived from the non-identity problem pro-natalists should accept cases such as abuse and slavery. But most are not ready to make that step, and on the other hand they refuse to infer from their opposition to such cases (an opposition which obviously is based on the fact that they view these lives as harmful regardless of if they are preferable by their victims) the self-evident conclusion that since every procreation involves forcing harms on others (most may not be as horrible as the mentioned cases, but all are definitely harmful) none of them can be morally justified.

Most of the discussions regarding the non-identity problem are about where to set the threshold instead of internalizing the inherent structured problem with procreation which is that there is always harm, there is never consent, there is always a chance of life unworthy in the eyes of the person created, there is no point in time when it can be determined that the created person’s life is worth living as it can always change, there is always harm to others, and of course that the only way to guarantee that there would truly be no harms and no victims is that there would be no subjects of harm and of harming.

References

Benatar David (2006) Better never to have been: the harm of coming into existence. Clarendon, Oxford

Finneron-Burns E (2015) What we owe to future people: a contractualist account of intergenerational ethics.

Gardner Molly (2015) A harm-based solution to the non-identity problem. Ergo; 2(17) pp. 427-444

Gardner Molly (2016). Beneficence and procreation. Philosophical Studies; 173(2) 321-336

Kumar R (2015) Risking and wronging. Philos Public Aff 43(1):27–51

McMahan Jeff (2009) Asymmetries in the morality of causing people to exist. In: Roberts MA, Wasserman DT(eds) Harming future persons: ethics, genetics and the nonidentity problem. Springer, New York

Parfit Derek Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press 1986)

Seana Valentine Shiffrin Harm And Its Moral Significance. Legal Theory, Available on CJO 2012 doi:10.1017/S1352325212000080

Steinbock, Bonnie Life Before Birth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992)

Steinbock Bonnie & McClamrock Bonnie When is Birth Unfair to the Child? University at Albany, SUNY January 1994

Weinberg Rivka Existence: who needs it? The non-identity problem and merely possible people
2012 Bioethics ISSN 0269-9702

Weinberg Rivka Identifying and dissolving the non-identity problem. Philos Stud (2008) (137):3–18

Wolf, C. Intergenerational justice. In Blackwell companion to applied ethics, eds. (2003)

The Non-Identity Problem – Part 2 – No One is Harmed by Not Existing

The following post is the second part of a text about the Non-Identity Problem and its relation to Antinatalism. If you haven’t read the first part yet, please do so before reading this one.

For those who have read the first part here is a very short reminder of the non-identity problem.
The Non-Identity Problem points at a paradox regarding harming future individuals.
Derek Parfit, the philosopher behind this claim, argues that despite the intuition that it is wrong to create a person in the case of what is considered to be severe congenital impairments, or in the case of what is considered to be an impaired environmental starting point, actually, as long as that person would have a life considered to be worth living overall, that person couldn’t be regarded as a victim of the impairments, or to even be harmed by them, since preventing them necessarily means that that person wouldn’t exist at all and so wouldn’t have what is considered as an overall worth living life.

In this post I’ll address the second main notion implied by the non-identity problem.

No One is Harmed by Not Existing

The second notion implied by the Non-Identity Problem is that an act that creates an impaired yet still worth living life, in a case that that same person could never have existed at all in the absence of that act, does not make things worse for, or harms, and is not “bad for”, that person.

Rivka Weinberg who I referred to in former posts (here and Hazardous Materials) describes it as follows:

“Because sperm are short-lived, our identities seem to depend on when we were conceived. And since it seems that almost anything we do affects the timeline of conceptions, almost anything we do also affects future identities: each person’s set of conception circumstances are virtually the only ones possible for her; her existence depends on them. The non-identity problem is thus the problem of identifying the person who is harmed by procreative decisions which seem to set back her life interests, given that her existence is worthwhile and dependent on that very same decision.” (Weinberg 2012, p.2)

And presents one of Parfit’s most famous examples for that matter:

“For example, if a 14-year-old girl deliberately creates a child who must suffer the disadvantages that having a child for a mother involves, who has the 14-year-old harmed? Intuitively, she has harmed her child, but because that child could not have been conceived at any other time and has a worthwhile life, we seem unable to say that.” (Weinberg 2012, p.3)

In other words, the claim is that given that the child’s life is considered worth living and it would not have been better for the child that s/he never have existed at all, then the child has not been harmed, or made worse off by its mother, and so her act is not bad for the child.

Before addressing this claim, an important note must be made regarding the term ‘life worth living’. Obviously this term, which is highly controversial, with many antinatalists thinking that the option doesn’t even exist, requires and deserves a separate and broader discussion. But I will address it here shortly and only in the context of the non-identity problem, arguing that even if, for the sake of the argument, I’ll accept the legitimacy of the term, ‘life worth living’ is not objective and permeant but by definition is subjective and temporary. A life worth living for one isn’t necessarily so for someone else, and even for the same person this status doesn’t necessarily stay the same throughout its entire life.
Lives are constantly changing, one can’t argue that s/he is benefiting someone by creating it since evidently that person feels that its life is worth living, partly because that feeling might change over time. At any given moment the created person may think that its life is not worth living depending on its life experiences. Does it make sense that the general moral status of procreation would change according to the child’s contingent and changeable perspective? Does it make sense that the general moral status of procreation would be depended upon what others do to a specific person all along its life? How does it make sense that the decision to procreate depends on whether someone would break that person’s heart? Or on whether that person would suffer bullying at school? Or on whether that person would be involved in a terrible accident?
Moral decisions mustn’t be based upon a criterion which might change at any given moment. But that is life and therefore another main reason why it is always morally wrong to procreate. Life worth living can extremely easily become not worth living, and in many cases it is completely independent of the actions of the original agents. Numerous factors can affect the outcome, numerous factors that are not at all depended on the parents. The fact that parents have so little control over the outcome doesn’t mean they are exempted from any responsibility but on the contrary, it places an even greater one on their shoulders since they have absolutely no way to guarantee that their children would have a life worth living.

Furthermore, since lives are changing all the time, and since all lives have the potential to change dramatically at any given moment, whether someone’s life is worth living or not can only be decided definitively when they end. Absurdly, it can only be determined whether one’s life is worth living when it is too late, and it is too late not when a person’s life is about to end, but when it begins, since once someone’s life has started there is no way back. It is possible for a person to prevent its future harms by ending its own not worth living life, but there is no way to undo all the harms that a person had experienced.

However, the core of the issue regarding the second notion implied by the Non-Identity Problem is claims such as – ‘it would not have been better for the child that s/he never have existed at all, therefore the child has not been made worse off by its mother’, and ‘the child has not been harmed at all’, so I’ll focus on them in this text.

It would not have been better for the child that s/he never have existed at all, therefore the child has not been made worse off by its mother

The only reason why it would not have been better for the created person that s/he never have existed at all, is because non-existence is not a state someone can be in. Non-existence is not worse or better than existence because there is no one there for whom it would be better or worse compared with existence.
The logic behind the claim that it would not have been better for the child that s/he never have existed at all, implies that there is such a state as non-existence where people can be sorry that they don’t exist, and their parents can decide whether to bring them into existence with their impairments or to leave them miserable in non-existence. Only that this is not the case. A person created is literally created. It comes out of nothing, not from a better or worse place. That person wasn’t and now it is. So if anything, the created person has not been made better or worse off by its parents, but not because it’s life is or isn’t worth living, but because before its parents created that person there was no one to benefit or to be worse off by its creation. Prior to a person’s creation, there is no one to compare the state of the created person to, so it can’t be better or worse off.

Since existence is the precondition for any harm or benefit, non-existence – the state in which no person can experience anything and therefore is by definition not harmful or beneficial to anyone – can’t be worse or better than existence. Not only that non-existence cannot be worse than existence, it cannot at all be harmful.

Procreation, even of a life worth living (if we accept that term for the sake of the argument), is not putting someone in a better place, but creating someone who wasn’t there prior to that decision. It is creating a vulnerable person who can be miserable, and in the case of a foreseen flawed life it is creating an even more vulnerable person than usual, and who is more likely to be miserable once forced into existence.

The claim that it would not have been better for the created person that s/he never have existed at all, is often framed as that it is better to live with impairments than having no life at all, as if there is such a state as having no life at all. People who don’t exist are not having no-life at all, they don’t live in nonexistence, but simply don’t exist. Framing the issue as if to never exist is to have no life at all sounds to many people like a bad option compared with having a life with some impairments, but that is wrong and misleading. The options are not either having no life at all, or having a life with impairments, but having life with impairments, and never existing, meaning never needing to overcome any impairments or needing anything whatsoever. It is not life with impairments or having nothing, but just life with impairments. And while there is something awfully wrong about creating a person with impairments, there is nothing wrong with not creating a person at all, let alone not creating one with severe impairments.

Even if the created person would have a life worth living it would not be better for that person than had s/he never existed since non-existence is not an option for an existing person.
The claim that creating a person is a benefit because it is supposedly taking that person to a better place than it was before its creation, is false since everyone were nothing before they were created. Questions of creation are not comparative. And following the same logic, since non-existence is not a state anyone can be in, and therefore is not comparable to existence, the created impaired person is harmed but not because it was forced into a worse off place, but simply because it was forced into a bad place. The harm caused to the created impaired person doesn’t stem from comparativeness with not existing, but simply from being forced to endure negative experiences in existence.
It is not that it is always better never to have been, but that it is always wrong to cause someone to be.

Non-existence is not comparable to existence, but the decision to create a person can be compared to the decision not to create a person, since there is an option not to create anyone. The parents’ reply that ‘had we acted in your benefit you wouldn’t even exist, so be satisfied with your misery’ is not sufficient. Foreseeing that an act will result in harming another person is a good reason not to perform it. The fact that in the case of procreation avoiding that act will result in that person never existing doesn’t nullify that ethical reason. In fact it strengthens it, since all harms necessarily happen in existence, but no person can be harmed by not being created.
Non-existence is by all means not worse, bad, harmful, depriving, frustrating, or anything negative. All negative things occur in existence only. There are no harms or deprivations in non-existence. There is literally nothing and no one. No one is missing anything or is harmed by anything. There is no one to be deprived of the life that no one had lived.

The claim that had we acted differently (for example had the 14 year old girl waited for when she is older to create a person), the created person would have not existed despite that s/he prefers its existence over never exiting, is manipulative. Given that only existence is a state someone can be in, and given that people are addicted to life, and given that when people are asked if their life is worth living or whether they rather never to have been most if not all automatically reflect on their current existence (despite that had they never existed, nothing of what they have experienced would have ever happened, and not that everything that they have ever experienced would be lost), and most people, no matter how hard their lives are, say that they rather exist.

More than it exposes a philosophical complication, the non-identity problem illuminates a psychological one. Since non-existence is not an option for an existing person, but is still mistakenly considered as one (since people automatically switch between never existing and stopping their existence right now), and all the more so as a worse one, even miserable lives are viewed as preferable to it. That doesn’t mean that life is worth living but that there is nothing else but life, no matter how horrible it is. The fact that even miserable people prefer existence is not comforting but exactly the opposite. The fact that life’s addiction mechanism is trapping people in misery makes life even more miserable.
The answer to the question is life worth living, is not yes, but actually what other options do I have? I already exist, suicide is a very hard and problematic option which would also harm loved ones, I am biologically built to survive, I am psychologically built to believe everything would be better no matter how objectively unlikely it is, so I am sticking to the only option I have. Existence is the only existing option, so most people prefer it despite that it is terrible. That’s not a reason to cherish it but to prevent it.

Since people are biological machines built to survive, who are living in a life worshiping culture, clinging on to life is natural and the default state. That doesn’t make life better but the exact opposite. It means that people would prefer to go on living despite living horrible lives with no logical reason to believe it would ever get better for them. They are addicted to life. People are afraid of non-existence even though the issue is of them never existing in the first place, not stopping to exist.

The non-identity problem should have made people realize that life is addicting. The fact that people prefer their existence, no matter how horrible it is, should be alarming. The fact that people are suffering so much and have no reason to believe that their condition would ever change for the better and still they think that their lives are worth living indicates how wrongfully they perceive non-existence. It indicates how the option of never to have been is immediately being translated to losing everything they have and being deprived of everything they had, despite that it is not at all so.

There is no sense in asking an existing person if s/he prefers to exist since there is no option never to have existed once someone exists. There is no such state as non-existence so it cannot be preferred. There is only existence and there are always harms in existence.
If we’ll ask someone why do you think that your life is worth living as clearly you don’t do what you want most of the time, you are not happy, you don’t live up to your dreams, you don’t enjoy yourself most of the time, you spend most of the time doing things you have no option but doing, so what is so worthwhile about it? The answer is probably ‘to enjoy what I have’, ‘to enjoy it while I can’, because ‘there are no other options’, ‘we must take the bad with the good’ and etc. These are actually admissions that life is not good by itself but that we must make the best out of it. Meaning we have no choice or other options so we better make the most of the one we have. That is not an explanation why life is good. At most, it can maybe serve as an explanation why one doesn’t necessarily need to end its life immediately, but it is definitely a very good reason not to create more lives.
The never born don’t miss anything, are not harmed by anything, and don’t harm anyone else. That’s why it is so obvious that abstaining from creating people is the right thing to do.

The child has not been harmed at all

As opposed to the claim derived from the non-identity problem, there is a victim in the case of procreation when there are foreseen severe impairments and it is the person who would be forced to endure negative experiences with no necessary reason, without consent, and with a very high probability of being extremely miserable, especially due to its bad starting point.
But creating a person is always imposing pain, frustration, death, the fear of death, illnesses, boredom, anger, anxiety, regret, disappointment, suffering and etc., on that person. That is sufficient for claiming that regardless of any foreseen severe impairments, procreation always harms the person created. That is sufficient to claim that actually, every child has been harmed.

Creating someone is always forcing into existence a person who now must constantly struggle to fulfill its needs and desires. Once someone is forced into existence with a very bad starting point it is even worse since that person would probably want and need as much as anyone else but would get less or would have to struggle much harder only to get the same as anyone else. The chances of a person with a bad starting point to fulfill some of its needless and pointless desires are even worse than others’ chances. No one can ever fulfill all of them or anything close, but that person is way behind. From that perspective, the harm done to that person is even greater than the one imposed on other persons, but it is not different on principle.

Every procreation is imposing an unnecessary harm on someone else, the case of a flawed life is just much worse. The foreseen impairments don’t constitute the moral wrongness of procreation, but they do intensify it because of the expected added suffering of the created person.

Except for cases of rapes in places where abortions are not an option, all procreations are preventable and unnecessary. All people are impaired in one way or another and so it is impossible to create a person with no impairments. It is just a matter of degree and of socially conditioned intuitions, not of a firm solid ethical principle which we can rationally base. Impairments are defined by what is socially acceptable. And it is not very profound to define what is ethical by what is normative. People are not rational ethicists but irrational self-interested inconsistent creatures, so they arbitrarily determine the threshold for what they think is too much unnecessary impairments, while actually they are all unnecessary.

And that fact reveals the partiality in one of the most common ways people try to solve the non-identity problem.
Some counter the non-identity problem’s conclusion that the child has not been harmed, by claiming that to be born with impairments is to be born in a harmed state and parents who choose to bring to birth a disabled child are responsible for harming that child and causing that child to suffer from this harm.
This claim is one of the reasons I think that the non-identity problem should actually reveal some moral flaws inherent in every procreation, as it is always the case that the created person is born with some level of impairment (only because everyone feels pain and everyone must die we tend not to view these imperatives as impairments but they are, and no life includes “only” these as impairments), and so it is always the case that people are born in a harmed state, and therefore parents are always harming their children by creating them. Obviously, and as argued above, I certainly agree that it is wrong to create a person with more foreseen impairments since it is knowingly putting a person in a position of more harm, but the point is that every procreation is putting a person in a position of harm. Therefore, claiming that the particular creation of a person with foreseen severe impairments is an unnecessary harm, implies that creating a person without foreseen severe impairments is a necessary harm. But creating new persons is not necessary and creating new persons with no impairments whatsoever is not possible. Therefore creating a person is always imposing an unnecessary harm.

Since anything bad that happens to someone necessarily happens to that someone in existence, and since nothing bad can ever happen to anyone who doesn’t exist, to force existence on someone might not be bad had nothing bad ever happened to that person, but once something bad does happen to that person, the parents have harmed the created person. Since it is impossible that nothing bad would ever happen to someone, forcing existence is always necessarily harming someone else.

Most of the examples that the Non-Identity Problem refers to are of impairments such as severe diseases, or severe retardation, or severe physical disability, but what about cases of people who feel that their lives are not worth living with none of these impairments?
If, according to the non-identity problem, when the created person’s life is considered to be worth living despite its severe impairments that person has not been harmed, then people who feel the opposite about their lives, meaning that they are not worth living, are harmed and are wronged and it is unethical to create them regardless of any foreseen impairments.
If the parents don’t harm their child by creating it with severe impairments as long as the child’s life is considered worth living, why aren’t they considered as harming their child in case s/he doesn’t feel that its life is worth living despite that s/he has no severe “objective” impairments? If the criterion isn’t objective impairments but subjective ones, then it should apply in cases when there are no severe “objective” impairments. And since it is always an option that the created person would feel that its life is not worth living, it is always wrong to create a new person.
If the 14 year old mother didn’t harm her child since despite everything the child prefers to exist, then parents that their child doesn’t prefer to exist did harm their child no matter how seemingly good that persons’ life is. The point is that even if it is debatable whether to create a person with a horrible but still worth living life is harming that person, it mustn’t be debatable that creating a person whose life is not worth living according to the person living it, is a very serious harm.
Life not worth living is always an option, and any life can turn not worth living at any given moment. Something terrible that makes life not worth living can always happen. And then according to the logic of the argument, the parents did wrong the child.

The case of procreation by the 14-year-old girl is even worse since had she waited, she would have probably caused at least a lesser harm. But the more important point for that matter is that she doesn’t have only two options. The case isn’t should she wait until she is 28 since the person she would create then is expected to have a better life than the person she would create at the age of 14, but should she create a person at all? Why is it a choice between a horrible option and a more normative option but still a horrible one?
The claim is usually framed as had she waited the life of the person created is expected to be better. But expected and better are not enough. It must be guaranteed not expected, and that it would be great not better, and that can never be the case.

The fact that misery would be created is sufficient not to create a person at all. The fact that the 14 year old mother could have waited and created a less miserable person, and the fact that in any case there would be harm to others, and that it is putting the created person at a huge risk, without its consent, makes the case of procreation of an impaired person particularly cruel. Language tricks are merely a smokescreen. There is harm, there is a victim, and many more who would be victimized by the victim, and there is an appalling decision by the parents.

Sometimes lives that start out with relatively good starting point turn out to be worse than lives with a much worse starting point. There is no guarantee for anything except that there is always a harm, it is always purposeless, it is always without consent, it is never necessary, there is always a risk of extremely miserable life, and there is always a guarantee of extreme harm to others.

References

Benatar David (2006) Better never to have been: the harm of coming into existence. Clarendon, Oxford

Finneron-Burns E (2015) What we owe to future people: a contractualist account of intergenerational ethics.

Gardner Molly (2015) A harm-based solution to the non-identity problem. Ergo; 2(17) pp. 427-444

Gardner Molly (2016). Beneficence and procreation. Philosophical Studies; 173(2) 321-336

Kumar R (2015) Risking and wronging. Philos Public Aff 43(1):27–51

McMahan Jeff (2009) Asymmetries in the morality of causing people to exist. In: Roberts MA, Wasserman DT(eds) Harming future persons: ethics, genetics and the nonidentity problem. Springer, New York

Parfit Derek Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press 1986)

Seana Valentine Shiffrin Harm And Its Moral Significance. Legal Theory, Available on CJO 2012 doi:10.1017/S1352325212000080

Steinbock, Bonnie Life Before Birth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992)

Steinbock Bonnie & McClamrock Bonnie When is Birth Unfair to the Child? University at Albany, SUNY January 1994

Weinberg Rivka Existence: who needs it? The non-identity problem and merely possible people
2012 Bioethics ISSN 0269-9702

Weinberg Rivka Identifying and dissolving the non-identity problem. Philos Stud (2008) (137):3–18

Wolf, C. Intergenerational justice. In Blackwell companion to applied ethics, eds. (2003)

The Non-Identity Problem – Part 1 – Thousands of Identified Victims

The Non-Identity Problem points at a paradox regarding harming future individuals.
Derek Parfit, the philosopher behind this claim, argues that despite the intuition that it is wrong to create a person in the case of what is considered to be severe congenital impairments, or in the case of what is considered to be an impaired environmental starting point, actually, as long as that person would have a life considered to be worth living overall, that person couldn’t be regarded as a victim of the impairments, or to even be harmed by them, since preventing them necessarily means that that person wouldn’t exist at all and so wouldn’t have what is considered as an overall worth living life.

Parfit himself doesn’t necessarily support the conclusions coming from this reasoning, but suggests that ethicists must develop a new ethical theory to resolve the paradox that stems from the fact that on the one hand we have a very strong intuition that creating a person with foreseen severe impairments is harming that person, and on the other hand, that as long as that person’s life is considered worth living overall, it is hard to point at a specific person who is harmed by the severe impairments, which without them that person could not exit at all. This new theory Parfit is referring to (which he calls theory X) must resolve the problem that we feel that an act is wrong despite that it is not wrong for anyone specific, or in other words, it needs to answer the question – how can an act be considered a harm if no one was harmed by it?

So despite that Parfit himself originally wished to resolve a paradox, his argument fed and still feeds many pro-natalitsts who are asking, how can the act of creating someone be wrong if it is not bad for anyone specific?

In this post, as well as the next two, I’ll address the three main notions implied by the non-identity problem.

Thousands of Identified Victims

The first notion implied by the non-identity problem, involves the narrow person-affecting ethical theory, according to which – an act is wrong only if it makes things worse for a particular, identified person. In Parfit’s words, “the “bad” act must be “bad for” someone” (Parfit 1987, p.363), and in the case of creating a person with what is considered to be foreseen severe impairments (be them biological or environmental), yet whose life is considered to be worth living overall, it is hard to point at a specific person who is harmed by that action.

In the second and third parts I argue that the person created is harmed even if that person would have a life considered to be worth living overall. But even if, for the sake of the argument, I’ll accept the claim that as long as the created person has a life considered to be worth living that person wasn’t harmed, that doesn’t make its creation ethical, even according to the narrow person-affecting ethical theory alone, because each procreation is always bad for a particular identified someone. There is always a specific person who is harmed by the creation of each person, a specific person with a specific identity. In fact there are thousands, and these are the thousands of persons who will be harmed as part of supporting the existence of the created person. Every person has to eat, and every food has a price. Unfortunately, most people are choosing the most harmful option – animal based foods. Each person directly consumes thousands of animals. More accurate average figures are varied according to each person’s location. An average American meat eater for example consumes more than 2,020 chickens, about 1,700 fish, more than 70 turkeys, more than 30 pigs and sheep, about 11 cows, and tens of thousands of aquatic animals.
Since most humans, more than 95% of them actually, are not even vegans – the most basic and primal ethical decision every person must make – the creation of each human person forces the creation of thousands of persons whose lives are of the most miserable lives imaginable.
Besides the harm inflicted directly by eating animals, each person also harms many others by eating plant based food, as well as by buying clothes, shoes, cosmetics, detergents, plastic, paper, metals, using electricity, transportation, and practically every possible action. Every action is at others’ expense. Procreation is always bad since it is always bad for someone. Even if one insists it is not bad for the one created, it is still bad for someone. Extremely bad, and for many someones.

Everyone who decides to procreate harms someone even if the created person would live a life considered to be worth living, since that creation comes at the cost of a life not worth living for many others. Even if the created person isn’t miserable, it would definitely make others miserable.
It is not moral to create lives not worth living even by the premises of the non-identity problem, and the creation of new people is definitely causing the creation of many lives not worth living – the lives of those who would be created to support the lives of the new created people. That is mainly the lives of animals in factory farms meaning more than 160 billion animals per year which would live lives not worth living. The more people created, and no matter if their own lives would be considered worth living or not, the more lives not worth living are created in general.
So even if we’ll accept, for the sake of the argument, the criterion of a life worth living, still, since creating people is necessarily creating lives not worth living, if not theirs then definitely the lives of the ones they would harm – sentient creatures who feel nothing but suffering for their entire lives – it is never ethical to procreate.

So we don’t need to explain how acts that make things worse for no one, such as creating a person whose life is considered worth living, can be wrong, since procreation is never an act that makes things worse for no one. In fact, it makes things horrendous for thousands.

References

Benatar David (2006) Better never to have been: the harm of coming into existence. Clarendon, Oxford

Finneron-Burns E (2015) What we owe to future people: a contractualist account of intergenerational ethics.

Gardner Molly (2015) A harm-based solution to the non-identity problem. Ergo; 2(17) pp. 427-444

Gardner Molly (2016). Beneficence and procreation. Philosophical Studies; 173(2) 321-336

Kumar R (2015) Risking and wronging. Philos Public Aff 43(1):27–51

McMahan Jeff (2009) Asymmetries in the morality of causing people to exist. In: Roberts MA, Wasserman DT(eds) Harming future persons: ethics, genetics and the nonidentity problem. Springer, New York

Parfit Derek Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press 1986)

Seana Valentine Shiffrin Harm And Its Moral Significance. Legal Theory, Available on CJO 2012 doi:10.1017/S1352325212000080

Steinbock, Bonnie Life Before Birth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992)

Steinbock Bonnie & McClamrock Bonnie When is Birth Unfair to the Child? University at Albany, SUNY January 1994

Weinberg Rivka Existence: who needs it? The non-identity problem and merely possible people
2012 Bioethics ISSN 0269-9702

Weinberg Rivka Identifying and dissolving the non-identity problem. Philos Stud (2008) (137):3–18

Wolf, C. Intergenerational justice. In Blackwell companion to applied ethics, eds. (2003)

10 Good Things that Actually Should Have Never been needed to Happen

In an article called 10 actually good things that happened in 2023, published in VOX on the occasion of the end of the year, it is argued that despite 2023 being a hard year, 10 news stories can function as a reminder that a better future is possible.

However, reviewing these 10 supposedly actually good things reveals that maybe except for one, they are all actually things that are good in the sense of stopping something bad, not good in themselves.

Many pro-natalists are trying to counter-argue antinatalism by saying that there are many good things in life, but most if not all fail to point at something which is good in itself and not something that eases or solves something bad. And although the article is not at all about procreation, more or less the same goes for the list of supposedly actually good things that happened in 2023 that it mentions.

Don’t get me wrong, the things the article covers are very positive, some are amazingly positive, but they are so because they are solving, or at least mitigating, bad things.
The first thing in their list, for example, is that ‘the economy started undoing 40 years of rising inequality’, which is of course very very positive, but I don’t think that something should be considered as an ‘actually good thing’ if it is actually starting to fix something very bad that should have never happened in the first place. It is very good that, hopefully, the U.S economy is finally starting to deal with wage inequality between poor and wealthy workers, but this inequality should have never happened in the first place. And of course (as mentioned clearly in the article) inequality still remains, and probably will keep remaining, a defining feature of the American economy.

Another example is that psychedelic-assisted therapy seeks FDA approval. But like the case of wage inequality between poor and wealthy, this is an example of a very positive thing because it tackles a very bad thing (mental illnesses like PTSD, depression, and anxiety) and like the case of wage inequality it is an example of something that should have happened much earlier, and probably only due to the conservative fear of psychedelic substances, it didn’t.

An example given in this article which is much closer to home is decriminalization of abortions in Latin America. Clearly a case of something terrible – criminalization of women’s rights over their own bodies – starting to be fixed (and unfortunately while backsliding in other places such as the U.S), is not an actually good thing, but something that it is absolutely outrages that had ever happened in the first place.

Three additional examples of things that it is absolutely outrages that had ever happened in the first place, are: the Supreme Court in USA upheld America’s strongest animal welfare law which is California’s Proposition 12 – a law requiring that much of the eggs, pigs meat and veal sold in the state come from animals given more space on factory farms; the US Department of Agriculture gave final approval for a “cell-cultivated” chicken meat; and that Europe is phasing out the practice of “male chick culling”.
But there should have never been factory farming in the first place. Starting to slightly and slowly improve the worst thing that humans have ever done is actually not a good thing. It doesn’t make the world a good place but a little bit less terrible.
As the article says: “Each year, the global egg industry hatches 6.5 billion male chicks, but because they can’t lay eggs and they don’t grow big or fast enough to be efficiently raised for meat, they’re economically useless to the industry. So they’re killed hours after hatching, and in horrifying ways: ground up or burned alive, gassed with carbon dioxide, or suffocated in trash bags.” And none of that should have ever happened. Humans should have never consumed chicken’s eggs, let alone creating an industrial breed of chickens who lay so many eggs, and cage them in some of the worst facilities ever invented, and humans should have never created a different type of chickens bred to grow bigger and faster at the expense of their own health and welfare. Slightly reducing an atrocity that should have never happened in the first place should not be considered something good.
All these examples can be considered as something good only in a world which is so terribly bad. And if the world is so terribly bad, improving some of its atrocities is far from being sufficient.

And lastly, the article mentions important developments in treatments and vaccines that happened in 2023. But this is something good only if it is necessary that there would be diseases, but it is not. There are diseases, and pain and suffering and any other bad thing in this world, only because people are creating more people, and more other sentient beings, to whom bad things happen. But it is not necessary to create new sentient beings, therefore this suffering is unnecessary. And causing unnecessary suffering is wrong.

It is argued in the article that “when the world is mired in horrible things, it’s important to imagine a better future; without hope, new solutions wouldn’t be possible”, a sort of claim often being used by many pro-natalists to supposedly counter antinatalism, a claim which I have already addressed in another post. Therefore I’ll not repeat all the points I made there, but will make do with the one which is most relevant to the article covering good things that happened in 2023. Even if it was true that it is better in the present than it was in the past, better doesn’t necessarily mean good. Something can be better than something else yet be terrible in itself. The fact that things could have been worse, or if it is true that they have been worse, doesn’t mean that now they are good. If at all true, all this claim can stand for is that it is better in the present than it was, and that it is better in the present than it could have been, but not by any means that it is good in the present. And even if it was true that it is better in the present than it was in the past, there is absolutely no guarantee that it would be better in the future. It also might be a lot worse. And it already is a living hell.

At this moment, there is a war going on somewhere, a nation is crying out for independence in another place, somewhere else there is a political repression, not far from there an ethnical repression, right next to it religious repression, and riots against corruption are being violently hushed by the authorities everywhere. Human history is an endless battle over things that should have been absolutely basic a long time ago and they are absolutely far from being so in the present, so why would they be in the future? If the present is not significantly better than the past why assume that the future will be?

If humanity has yet to succeed solving basic issues among itself, and when many of them become even worse, and new ones emerge, what is the basis for the assumption that the future is going to be better? On what grounds do they assume that present violent conflicts would be solved in the future, and more importantly that new ones won’t constantly emerge?
Was there any reduction in the scope of weapon manufacture in recent years? In arms trade? In developing more lethal and destructive weapons? Did people stop fighting over territories? Over resources? Over religious differences? Did humanity become wiser and more educated and realized that it is totally insane to fight over the “right way” to worship a fictional entity? Did humanity become wiser and more educated and realized that profits are way less important than welfare? Did humanity become wiser and more educated regarding how to raise happy people? Did humanity become wiser and more educated and figured out the purpose of the whole thing? Can it provide a reasonable answer to the so fundamental self-evident and primary question – what is the meaning of life?

And lastly, even if it was true that the present is better than the past and that the future would be better than the present, what for? To what purpose? There is no aim to achieve in the future, there is no important goal to accomplish, and no one who is waiting to exist in the future, so what logical explanation let alone ethical justification is there to sacrifice generations upon generations of humans, and many more of nonhumans, so maybe a tiny fraction of all the sentient creatures who would be forced to be created theretofore would live in a supposedly better world? That is morally reprehensible in every possible respect.

The Liberal Oxymoron

Liberal societies seemingly highly value liberty and individualism but there is something oxymoronic about it when the general approach is actually – stay out of my plate, stay out of my closet, don’t tell me how to raise my kids, how to treat my dog, where to throw my trash, and certainly stay out of my ovaries, despite that all of the above and a lot more, are usually if not always, harmful to other individuals. Ordinarily, the attitude of most is demanding people to butt out of their lives no matter how wrong and harmful they are to others, because it is their life, and they are free to do as they please.
This is not individualism but more like every individual for him/her self. This is not liberalism but egoism. There is no respect to others’ liberties and individualism, or identifying ‘the other’ as an independent autonomic being. If that was the case then all people would have been vegans (so not to violate the liberty of the individuals they consume), environmentalists (so not to violate the liberty of the individuals that they pollute and destruct their habitats), and would have realized that they should not procreate as it is definitely a case of imposing one’s desires on another individual. It is imposing on another individual the most important element in one’s life – its existence.

Liberalism allegedly highly values liberty and freedom of choice, but giving people the choice and liberty to create other people is imposing on the created people the structured oppressiveness bound in existence, and it is disregarding their lack of choice and liberty in being created. No one was ever created by its own choice. No one is ever truly free. Everyone is stuck in their own mind and body. Some hate one of them, others hate both, and all are trapped within them and within a given reality, which many hate very much. This is a very important point but even if this wasn’t the case, meaning even if most people had been satisfied with the mind, body and the set of living conditions which were forced on them, although the wrongness of breeding was less severe and the problem was less urgent, it still was anti-liberty and anti-individualistic. And for all the ones who are regularly and systematically harmed by people, obviously it would have still been as wrong and as urgent as it is in the case of the created people hating their lives. As far as the victims are concerned, there is no difference whether their victimizers are happy or miserable or anything in between, they are miserable always and regardless.

Life always involves severe structured restrictions and significant intrinsic limitations. A person can’t escape who s/he is, or the reality it was forced into and that shaped that person in so many ways. Even if you are certain that the most crucial factor in shaping a person is its environment and not its genetics (there are studies supporting each side so it is hard to tell whether it is more nature or more nurture, but there is no doubt that both are critical), it is not always possible to get out of a bad environment, and it is definitely impossible to absolutely null its effect. And even in cases of “good genetics” and amazing environment, something bad can always happen to someone, independently of any biological and environmental factor. Procreation is always an imposition, even when everything is great. And, supposedly great lives, can always reverse.

An important point which should be clarified is that obviously liberalism has brought many good and important notions into people’s lives such as freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of association, civil rights and civil liberties, and that’s only a partial list. Liberalism also had a very positive effect in terms of procreation since placing the individual in the center of attention as opposed to the nation, society, god and etc., made people realize they don’t have to procreate if they don’t want to, because it is their desires that count most. But that effect, as I argue in a different text is mostly indirect, and it goes both ways (it is great that some people can choose not to create a new person if they don’t want to, but on the same line of thought many feel that they are entitled to, if they do want to).
A more direct effect, which is also on a larger ethical scale, is that placing the liberty of the individual in the center of attention resulted not only in people starting to place their own interests before their supposed gods’ supposed interests, and their supposed nation’s and society’s interests, but also the interests of others. Obviously I am not saying here that it is liberalism which initiated moralism (clearly moralism came way before it), but that it had a crucial and indispensable part in more and more ethical traditions focusing on the interests of others as the basic, if not the only, relevant criterion in ethics.
So this text is not about putting the blame on liberalism. The point is not to criticize the philosophical and political aspects of liberalism (although there are certainly good reasons to do so as it is hard to separate liberalism and capitalism, including its more aggressive versions for example), but to point at the hypocrisy and double standard among liberal societies when it comes to procreation. Freedom of choice, autonomy and consent are of the most basic and elementary aspects of liberalism, yet they are totally overlooked even in the most liberal societies in the world, when it comes to creating new people. The created individual is an appliance, a commodity that existing people are free to choose whether to create or not, without even considering if they should ask the person they are about to create whether it wants to be created. And since obviously it is impossible to ask that person, they should infer that they mustn’t impose their own choice on another autonomic individual who neither gave its consent nor was free to choose its own existence.

Debating Procreation – David Benatar & David Wasserman

The following post is dedicated to a book called Debating Procreation. The book is divided into two parts. The first one is written by David Benatar, in which he presents 3 arguments for antinatalism. The second part is written by David Wasserman who criticizes Benatar’s arguments and presents a pronatalism argument.

The name of the book is a bit misleading since it is not really a debate but rather two independent monologues. There is no Q&A section or even methodical replies by each side to the other’s arguments. However, Benatar’s half is highly recommended. Obviously it is hard to overcome the primacy of Better Never To Have Been, but in my view this text is much better and for several reasons: the problematic Asymmetry Argument gets less attention (but is still the first argument he displays), the Quality of Life Argument is presented here in an improved form (mostly since there is a greater emphasis on the risk aspect), and most importantly, after being totally absent in Benatar’s previous works, he finally included the harm to others as part of his antinatalism argument. The harm to others, in my view, is the most important antinatalism argument, so I was very pleased to see Benatar successfully and thoroughly construct it.

Unfortunately, he decided to title the harm to others argument as the misanthropic argument, and by that in a way, continue the anthropocentric tradition of focusing on the human race. Surely this part of the text is very unflattering for humanity, but it still focuses on humanity, instead of on its victims, who are supposed to be, at least in the harm to others argument, the center of attention. He calls the first two arguments of his part of the book the philanthropic arguments since they focus on humans as victims of procreation, and he calls the third one the misanthropic argument since it focuses on how destructive and harmful the human race is and so it better not exist. So all three arguments focus on humanity, while it could have easily been framed as antinatalist arguments for the sake of the one who does not yet exit, and antinatalist arguments for the ones who already exist and would be harmed by the ones who will be created, without even mentioning any biological species.

Yet, leaving the title issue aside, the misanthropic argument is in my opinion by far Benatar’s best argument.

Basically it goes as follows:

“The strongest misanthropic argument for anti-natalism is, I said, a moral one. It can be presented in various ways, but here is one:

  1. We have a (presumptive) duty to desist from bringing into existence new members of species that cause (and will likely continue to cause) vast amounts of pain, suffering, and death.
  2. Humans cause vast amounts of pain, suffering, and death.
  3. Therefore, we have a (presumptive) duty to desist from bringing new humans into existence.” (p.79)

Benatar devotes a considerable part of the misanthropic argument section to base the second premise of his argument. Based on some famous social psychology experiments, as well as other evidences from other fields, he details about humans’ violent tendencies, scary conformism and etc. This sub-section is called Human Nature—The Dark Side.
Then he mentions some notorious historical atrocities humans have inflicted on each other, writing: “Humans have killed many millions of other humans in war and in other mass atrocities, such as slavery, purges, and genocides.”

After specifying some of the violence humans inflict on other humans, he goes on specifying violence humans inflict on animals. In this sub-section he reviews the major animal exploitation industries, briefly describing the horrible life in each.

The last part of his foundation of the second premise is the harm that humans cause to other humans and to animals by the destructive effect they have on the environment.
He writes:

“For much of human history, the damage was local. Groups of humans fouled their immediate environment. In recent centuries the human impact has increased exponentially and the threat is now to the global environment. The increased threat is a product of two interacting factors—the exponential growth of the human population combined with significant increases in negative effects per capita. The latter is the result of industrialization and increased consumption.
The consequences include unprecedented levels of pollution. Filth is spewed in massive quantities into the air, the rivers, lakes, and seas, with obvious effects on those humans and animals who breath the air; live in or near the rivers, lakes and seas; or get their water from those sources.” (p.99)

Benatar is aware that most people would reply to his misanthropic argument saying that instead of preventing humans’ procreation we should reduce their destructiveness. But he disagrees:

“we cannot expect that human destructiveness will ever be reduced to such levels. Human nature is too frail and the circumstances that bring out the worst in humans are too pervasive and likely to remain so. Even where institutions can be built to curb the worst human excesses, these institutions are always vulnerable to moral entropy. It is naïve utopianism to think that a species as destructive as ours will cease, or all but cease, to be destructive.” (p.104)

And adds:

“Given the current size of the human population and the current levels of human consumption, each new human or cohort of humans adds incrementally to the amount of animal suffering and death and, via the environmental impact, to the amount of harm to humans (and animals).” (p.109)

And concludes:

Humans would never voluntarily cease to procreate, and would never cease to be destructive. That’s why we must aim at human extinction by forced sterilization.

Pro-Natalism

The second part of the book is written by David Wasserman who argues for the defense of procreation. He begins with a brief critique of Benatar’s asymmetry, mainly by mentioning the familiar aspects which were specified in the post dedicated to it, so there is no point repeating it here. He also criticizes Benatar’s quality-of-life argument, again mainly by mentioning the familiar aspects such as that Benatar offers unduly pessimistic assessments and inappropriately perfectionist standards.
A more interesting claim he makes is regarding the dynamics between Benatar’s asymmetry and his quality-of-life argument, a point which was mentioned in the post regarding extinction and pro-mortalism. Wasserman wonders why Benatar even needs the asymmetry argument (which he calls the comparative argument) and is not sufficed with the quality-of-life argument (which he calls the philanthropic argument), as Benatar:

“does not regard his comparative argument by itself as making the case that all procreation is wrongful. That case also requires his philanthropic argument, which is designed to show just how bad our lives really are. But if it is the magnitude of the harm that gives rise to a complaint, not the conclusion that life is always a harm, then it is not clear what role the comparative argument plays in reaching that conclusion. If careful scrutiny and critical assessment could show that life was very harmful overall for everyone, or almost everyone, then why would it matter for purposes of a moral complaint that it was also disadvantageous in comparison with nonexistence? The extremely high odds of a very bad existence would make procreation wrongful on any reasonable decision rule for risk or uncertainty.” (p.151)

So Wasserman thinks that Benatar should make do with his quality-of-life argument and doesn’t need the asymmetry, but he doesn’t agree with it for reasons which were mentioned above, and since he thinks that not only the risks must be considered but also their probability (which he claims are very low). To that he adds criticism of the attempt to use principles taken from Rawls’s Theory of Justice to constitute an antinatalist argument. Both arguments, the risk and Rawls’s Maximin, are worthy of a separate discussion. The one about risk can be found here, and the one about Rawls’s theory of justice can be found here. Therefore, I’ll not detail them here.

Intuitively, it would make sense to mainly focus here on Wasserman’s counter arguments to the misanthropic argument, given that this is Benatar’s novel argument in this book, and since I think that the harm to others is the most important antinatalist argument. However, Wasserman cowardly, poorly, and extremely speciesistly, evades the argument of the harm to others. His evasiveness is another proof that there is no way to seriously confront this claim. Wasserman’s response to the harm to others argument, as unbelievable as it is two decades into the third millennium, is almost Cartesian, meaning he simply denies the moral validity of animals’ suffering, this is what he wrote:
“I can only respond briefly, in part because I strongly disagree with Benatar’s weighing of the suffering of minimally-sentient animals, a disagreement we cannot resolve here.” (p.166)
Benatar details some of the common horrors done to animals on daily basis in factory farms, laboratories, the entertainment business, and the clothing industry, claiming that: “Humans inflict untold suffering and death on many billions of animals every year, and the overwhelming majority of humans are heavily complicit.” (p. 93) and Wasserman’s reply is that animals don’t really matter. That’s it. His “reply” is simply disgraceful.

Regarding the harms to other humans that Benatar details about as part of the misanthropic argument, Wasserman’s reply is that he disagrees most sharply with Benatar on the implications of human destructiveness and cruelty for individual procreative decisions. And surprisingly, the argument he uses to justify this claim, in my view, undermines moral philosophy:

“I do no think prospective parents must “universalize” about the likely consequences if everyone judged or acted as they do. I think the concerns about the consequences “if everyone did it” have far more relevance for policymakers than prospective parents. Although the latter must be cautious in their predictions about their children and may reasonably have concerns about the fairness and cumulative impact of similar decisions, I believe that they do not need to give this the same weight in their decisions as policymakers or other impartial third parties should in theirs.” (p.167)

Universalizing decisions and acting as policymakers is exactly how ethics should work. That doesn’t imply using Kant’s categorical imperative for any possible case, but Wasserman doesn’t even suggest exceptional cases or anything of this sort. He practically permits people to act as they wish as long as they are not official policymakers, as if only the actions of the latter have consequences. Obviously all actions have consequences, and all consequences must be considered ethically, especially when it comes to actions that everyone can do, like creating a new person.
What’s the point in morality if it is subjective? What exactly is the validation of ethics if every couple can be their own personal policymakers?

I wanted to seriously confront a serious opposition to the misanthropic argument, but Wasserman didn’t provide one. So I’ll focus in the rest of this text on three other points that he makes which I have found worth addressing.

The Good Of The Children

The first point is Wasserman’s claim, and the example allegedly proving that claim, that people can have a child for the child’s sake:

“Here is an example to give some flesh, and plausibility, to the idea that prospective parents can create children for reasons that concern the good of the children, or at least their shared good. Consider a couple who very much want children and decide to adopt. They are normally fertile, but are moved by the need to find homes for the many orphaned children in their country now housed in institutions. This, however, is not their primary reason for adopting; it merely tips the balance. Their reasons include wanting the fulfillment of raising a child from a young age, seeking the uniquely intimate relationship that a child develops with its parents, and giving the child a good home—among the reasons given in surveys of prospective parents. They regard these as reasons that could be served equally well by adoption or conception. Just as they are going to start visiting orphanages, their government prohibits adoption—orphans and abandoned children will be wards of the state, with temporary foster parents in special cases. The couple is very disappointed but quickly decides to go with “Plan B”—they conceive a child for the same reasons.
The point of this example is not just to illustrate that adoption and procreation may be done for similar reasons. As important for my purposes, it suggests the limited role that the actual vs. contingent existence of the child may play in the sorts of reasons prospective parents have. The couple in my example starts by seeking to find a child of their own who already exists, or whose existence is not contingent on their actions. Barred from doing so, they shift to creating a child. But their reasons for doing the latter are largely the same as their reasons for having sought the former. The desire to help existing needy children was just a tiebreaker.” (p.190)

I fail to see the reasoning behind this argument or the explanatory power of this example.
If anything this example proves the opposite. It goes to show that these people want a child of their own, not to help someone in need. If they find no difference in that sense between adopting a child and creating one, then clearly the interests of the child weren’t their motive, as in one option there is an existing child who is orphan and so in need, and in the other option there is no one who needs anything.
It is the parents who wanted the fulfillment of raising a child from a young age. Before they have procreated, that child didn’t exist and so didn’t share their want. It wasn’t in the interests of that child to be raised from a young age. Non-existing persons don’t have interests and no wants, so it can’t be for the good of the child. An existing child on the other hand, does have an interest to be raised from a young age. That’s a very important difference between the two cases.

And same goes for the second reason – no non-existing person is seeking the uniquely intimate relationship that a child develops with its parents. But existing persons – prospective parents, and even more so orphans – probably do. In the case of procreation, seeking the uniquely intimate relationship is the parents’ want imposed on the child they have created.
The last reason is no different. While orphans desperately need a good home, because they already exist but don’t have one, non-existing persons don’t need a home, or anything else for that matter. The need for a good home was created correspondingly with their creation.

There are many ways to really act for reasons that concern the good of the children, but none of them includes creating ones. There are many children who have parents but don’t have other things that would make their lives better, why not focus on them? Why not help children with their homework? Why not volunteer to babysit them every once in a while? Why not starting a children class for free? Why not choose professions that focus on care for the good of the children like being teachers, doctors, social workers, kindergartners, Clown Cares, and etc.?
If it was really benefiting children that was on their mind they would invest most of their time, energy and resources on existing children who are in need, instead of on someone who they have created its need by procreation. It doesn’t make any sense. Anyone who wants to provide a good home for someone in need, who feel they have so much love to give, who want to do good for others, can adopt a homeless dog from a shelter.

Wasserman argues that “For both adoptive and biological parents, the child’s “bare existence” is a necessary condition for fulfilling their primary end but is not, or need not be, a primary end in itself.” (p. 193) But that doesn’t explain choosing the most senseless option. And even if there wasn’t any other option for giving and the only option was truly to create a need, it is still treating someone as a means to an end. The child had neither interest nor any say in being created into existence. The child is a mean to the parents’ ends.

Unfortunately there is no shortage in philanthropist aims in this world, why choose to create a new one and focus on it? With so much misery in the world why create a new need? Doesn’t it make much more sense to focus on an existing need?

If this world lacks love and meaning, what is the point of increasing the number of creatures who need love and meaning? This is the stupidest form of giving.
Or, of course, that it is not really the reason why people procreate. The real reasons are that people feel powerful when someone is totally depended on them, they feel needed and important, it fills the empty and pointless lives of people with meaning, they believe it would save their relationships, it eases loneliness, it soothes their fear of getting old with no one to take care of them, biological impulse, genetical vanity, immortality illusion, continuity illusion, it makes them feel normal, it makes them look normal to others, conformism, stupidity, accident.

Tantrum in the Mall as a Sip of Lifelong Frustration

The second point I want to address is Wasserman’s argument regrading parents’ duty towards their children: “Even the most spoiled child should recognize that his parents do not have a duty to maximally satisfy his interests; that their own interests, as well as those of a myriad of others, appropriately limit their duty to satisfy his.” (p.154)

This claim might be true when that child would grow up but in real time that child suffers. As an adult that child might regret being so spoiled, but that doesn’t serve as compensation for the frustration at not getting maximum satisfaction. The fact that the child is wrong doesn’t make that child less wanting and less frustrated. Many children tend to keep crying and screaming when they don’t get what they want even after they are explained that what they want is exaggerated or that there is no option to provide them everything they want, any time they want it. And that, in my view, holds much more than might seem. Only because it is obvious that children don’t get everything they want, and also because the crying and screaming scene is so common, people don’t stop and think about the fact that they are creating someone who would want everything possible, and would have to compromise on very little of that. They don’t stop and think about the fact that they are creating someone who would be constantly frustrated.
And it doesn’t end at childhood, it continues throughout their whole life. It is only refined along the years, when children learn to suppress some of their desires (which might come out in different ways that are not necessarily more positive), or control their urges and desires (which again, doesn’t always turn out to be better), but this is forever. Frustration is forever.

The crying and screaming scene on the shopping mall floor because the child got a little bit smaller toy than wanted, which have become so familiar that it turned into a parenthood cliché, is much deeper than children being extremely spoiled. There are so many advices for how to deal with these scenes. Most blame the parents. And they are right, but not because they don’t know how to set boundaries for their children, but because they don’t know how to set boundaries for themselves. It is the parents who are too spoiled and selfish and careless about the effects on others. It is them who acted to promote their own interests and so created a toy for themselves. They don’t know how to postpone gratifications and therefore have created a new small unit of exploitation and pollution which doesn’t know how to postpone gratifications.

This scene, which is considered as parents’ initiation, and which some go through several times during a lifetime, has been so normalized, that rarely do people realize that this wanting being they have chosen to create, didn’t have to exist, and now that it does, it constantly wants things and is being constantly limited. Frustration, even when is the product of being spoiled, is still frustration. People must realize they are creating a wanting being which would be constantly unsatisfied. Quieter children who don’t cry and scream when not getting something, are viewed as more mature and better educated children, and less spoiled. That might be true, and they might internalize that being spoiled is not good, but looking at the screaming children getting their toys, makes them frustrated. Some of them want that toy just as much, but they have internalized the expectation of them to suppress their wants.

You can look at the mall scene as merely children being too spoiled, or as lack of parental authority, or the consequences of the snowflake attitude, or the effects of the consumerist society, or a little bit of each. But it is also a window of opportunity to comprehend that creating a child is creating a bottomless pit of wants which can’t be satisfied. Of course this example is totally marginal but it is not trivial just because it is so common. It is a window of opportunity because when children are in a state of tantrum there are almost no emotional impediments. Obviously, these scenes are in many cases very manipulative (children are not yet equipped with many tools to help them get what they want so they use what they have which is crying and screaming and kicking as hard as possible), however, they nevertheless express true helplessness. These incidents often occur when children feel they have no control over the circumstances. They want things but are helpless in getting them. Helplessness can often produce fear as the children are depended on other people’s wishes. These scenes are also much more raw than the customary desires of adults, as they are highly socialized to navigate their desires in more subtle ways.

In light of the horrors Benatar specified in the first part, obviously the mall scene doesn’t only pale but seems absolutely ridiculous. But I am not bringing it up as an example of human frustration, but as an example of the greatest trivialization of human’s most trivial frustration. What makes it interesting is the glimpse it offers for everybody to publicly see how much of a lump of wants a person is, and how much frustration even the most trivial scene contains, and how trivial frustration is in people’s lives. The scene is so trivial that everybody accepts it. The child would learn that we don’t get everything we want in life. Unfortunately the adults don’t learn that they shouldn’t create frustration, even if it is very very marginal.
Parents are forcing their children to give up the toy they want, because they have refused to give up the toys they wanted to create.

Russian Roulette

As mentioned earlier, I have addressed the risk argument in a separate text, so here I’ll make do with a quick note on Wasserman’s remark regarding Benatar’s risk imposition metaphor which according to him:

“gains spurious strength, I suspect, from the Russian roulette simile he employs, which has prospective parents pointing a gun at the head of their future child; a gun with a high proportion of chambers loaded. This simile is misleading. As the literature on the ethics of risk imposition and distribution points out, it matters a great deal if the threatened harm will be imposed intentionally. Shooting someone with a loaded gun is intentionally harming him, even if the discharge of a bullet had been far from certain.” (p.165)

One might argue that the parents are not always the ones who pull the trigger. However, they are definitely the ones who set the target, and they are the ones who load at least some of the bullets.
Parents who know that their children would experience suffering, and every parent knows that suffering is inevitable at least at some point in life, are setting the target. Had that child not been created by them, there would have been no one to shoot at.
They are loading some of the bullets by passing physical and mental traits which their children would suffer from. Other starting points might also affect the life of that child. If the environmental conditions are bad, then the gun is loaded with even more bullets. And if it is quite certain that the child is prone to a serious disease, or that the parents are prone to a serious disease, or have a violent history, for example, then the parents are also pulling the trigger, at least in some rounds, and the other rounds are being completed by other factors.
Since parents are creating persons out of their own will and for their own benefit, they are imposing an intended risk on someone else’s life. They don’t intend to harm their own children, but they intendedly ignore the fact that their children would surely be harmed.

When considering the harm to others, since the parents are the ones who provide their children food, clothes, energy and every other harmful aspect involved with supporting their life, they are definitely held responsible in every possible way. They have created this consuming being which wasn’t there and wasn’t deprived of anything before they have decided to create it, and now it exists, and it is hurting many sentient creatures in many different ways for no justified reason at all.
Considering the enormous harm every person inflicts on others, and the loaded weapon is not a gun, but an aircraft carrier.

References

Benatar David and Wasserman David, Debating Procreation: Is It Wrong to Reproduce?
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)

Benatar, D. Better Never to Have Been (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)

Antinatalism as Justice

The philosopher John Rawls, author of A Theory of Justice and Justice as Fairness, is not an antinatalist. Furthermore, the theory he developed along these books, is according to him, not an ethical framework but a political one. Yet, some of the basic ideas in the theory are often used in ethical discussions. In my view, applying his theory of justice on procreation, if genuinely used impartially, must lead to the conclusion that procreation is not fair and is unjust – it must lead to antinatalism.

The Original Position

Rawls’s theory of justice is an evolvement of the social contract doctrine, and is mainly based on the idea that justice can only be obtained by free and equal persons who jointly agree upon and commit themselves to principles of social and political justice. The theory suggests that the principles of justice, which according to Rawls would regulate an ideal society, are ones which would be chosen by every individual if every individual were in what he calls The Original Position.
The original position is a thought experiment in which each real citizen has a representative, and all of these representatives come to an agreement on which principles of justice should order the political institutions of the real citizens. The original position is designed to be a fair and impartial point of view that must be adopted when discussing the fundamental principles of justice in order to uncover the most reasonable principles of justice. The main tool for ensuring fairness and impartiality is The Veil of Ignorance – the parties in the original position are deprived of all knowledge regarding the personal characteristics and social and historical circumstances of the citizens they represent. This prevents arbitrary facts about citizens such as their gender, race, class, age, education, religion and etc., from influencing the representatives. They are also unaware of the political system of the society, its history, its class structure, economic system, or level of economic development, and even the time in which they are living (so they won’t overlook the expected interests of future generations).
The idea is that if the representatives know nothing about the people they represent, not only would they be unable to prioritize their personal interests, they would probably promote principles that are fair to all. If no one knows whose fate they are shaping, the rational choice would be to constitute principles that treat all fairly.

The original position, according to Rawls, sets fair and equal conditions for the parties to constitute a just social agreement. The fairness of the original agreement situation transfers to the principles everyone agree to. In other words, the agreement’s fairness is derived from the equal and fair conditions it was created under.

Maximin

Rawls argues that given that the parties are behind the veil of ignorance when setting the principles of justice, it is most rational for them to play it as safe as possible by choosing the alternative whose worst outcome leaves their citizens better off than the worst outcome of all other alternatives. Their aim should be to maximize the minimum regret or loss to well-being, therefore this rule is called maximin. In the original position context it means that the parties should maximize the minimum level of primary goods that the citizens they represent might find themselves with. And in a general context, it’s choosing the best possibility among the worst probabilities.
It is very likely that all parties would adopt the maximin rule since everyone understands that someone has to be in the worst position and since the representatives don’t know who they represent, for all they know it might be them. Therefore rational parties would choose the best possible worst case, by ensuring that the ones who are at the bottom of the social order, would be prioritized in terms of resources. In other words it would be rational of each to maximize the worse off case.

According to Rawls, given the unique character of the original position, being irrevocable and not renegotiable set of choices, a state where the parties decide the basic structure of their society, and the kind of social world they will live in, adopting the maximin rule is particularly rational and advisable. Because all one’s interests and future prospects are at stake in the original position, and there is no hope of renegotiating the outcome, a rational person would act upon the maximin rule. It is more rational under conditions of complete uncertainty, assuming an equal probability of occupying any position in society, always to choose according to the principle of maximin. Rawls’s logic is that if the worst case would be realized, at least it would be the best worst case possible.

Rawls claims that his theory is not being risk-averse, but rather entirely rational to refuse to gamble with basic liberties, equal opportunities, and essential resources, for the sake of the possibility of gaining more power, resources, and income.

A Theory of Antinatalism

Rawls’s theory of justice is a development of the social contract doctrine for an ideal of a well-ordered society. The original position and the veil of ignorance are hypothetical concepts of a thought experiment that aims at extracting and focusing on what really matters to people as social beings.
However, if we apply the basics of this theory to the issue of creating people, given that every possible life must be represented in the original position, including of course the possibility of people who feel that their lives are not worth living and that prefer that they had never existed, in terms of procreation, this would be the worse off case. Since in any case, even in a much better world than our horrible one, it is inevitable that some people would feel that their lives are not worth living, and that they rather never to have been, when it comes to creating people, being coerced to be born is the worst possible option, and so according to the maximin rule, we must never procreate.

The ‘worst case’ possibility is life not worth living. The probability of this option is morally irrelevant since it is the principle that counts, and according the Rawls’s theory of justice the principle is that the worse off are of primal consideration, even if the worse off option was relevant for a tiny minority only. Of course one can argue that if the principle leads us to an absurd conclusion, maybe we should reject it? But there is nothing absurd about this conclusion when it comes to creating people since no one would be harmed by not being created, and at least a tiny minority (which is actually probably hundreds of millions of people) would be forced to live a life not worth living if this conclusion won’t be applied. No matter what the quantitative proportions are, even if it is “only” few people against everyone else, since no one would be harmed had they never existed, and the “few” would be extremely harmed if existed, it is better that no one would exist.
Rejecting the maximin rule in the case of procreation, means imposing lives not worth living for the sake of the ones who might enjoy their lives. That is sacrificing some for the sake of others, and it is treating people, all the more so the less fortunate ones, as means to other people’ ends –  the more fortunate and already better off ones. If anything, that is absurd. How is it fair or just, that someone would suffer so others might enjoy themselves (and anyone with even the slightest familiarity with life knows how brief and fragile joy is), all the more so when none of them would be deprived of this joy had they not existed?

Prospective parents are in a veil of ignorance, they have no idea what kind of a life the person they are creating would be forced to endure. So the right thing to do is to play it as safe as possible by choosing the alternative whose worst outcome leaves their children better off than the worst outcome of all other alternatives. In procreation context the maximin rule means that the prospective parents should maximize the minimum level of harm that the persons they are creating might find themselves with. The way to maximize the minimum regret or loss to well-being, is not to procreate.

It is very likely that most prospective parents would not adopt antinatalism, despite that everyone understands that someone has to be in the worst position (since the prospective parents don’t know what kinds of lives their children would maintain, for all they know it might be them). The reason they won’t adopt antinatalism is that people are too careless, even when it comes to their own children. Therefore, prospective parents, who are definitely not rational parties, are not maximizing the worse off by not taking any risk that their children would lead miserable lives, but rather they are ignoring the worse off possibility, and for their own selfish sake.

It is quite obvious that since there is a possibility of life not worth living, and in fact there are many people who feel that way, then even if we ignore the inherent problems involved with people’s evaluations of their lives value, and for the sake of the argument totally accept their self-evaluation (despite it being totally biased and psychologically inclined), even the strongest pro-natalist claims – that people want to live – don’t hold against the possibility of a life not worth living in the eyes of the ones who live it.

Lives not worth living is not a theoretical possibility, it is a certainty. People whom their lives are not worth living would be born, and the chances for that happening are renewed with each procreation. Misery has no quota. The only way to avoid this worse off option is by not procreating.

Justice to Others

Finally and most importantly, Rawls’s original position consists of free and rational agents who represent humans only. When considering the interests of every sentient creature on earth (as we obviously must and Rawls totally omits), meaning that the original position would really include every morally relevant being, and the representatives have no idea the interests of whose species they represent, human procreation should not only be prohibited under the maximin rule, but as a fundamental violation of other sentient creatures’ most basic rights, such as the right to life, freedom from torture, the right for body integrity, freedom from discrimination, right to free movement, the right to be free from pain, the right not to be treated as means to others’ ends, and etc.

Rawls argues that maximin must be the prime guideline mostly in cases of uncertainty regarding the acceptable outcome, and if it is impossible to guarantee some crucial basic liberties. For nonhumans, humans’ procreation certainly brings about a very unacceptable outcome, and a guarantee that their most crucial and basic liberties would be violated.

I wrote earlier that prospective parents are in a veil of ignorance, but that is only regarding the lives their children would be forced to live. They are not in a veil of ignorance regarding the option that their children would be forced to live miserable lives, and that their children would definitely make the lives of others miserable. They know very well that the first scenario is highly possible, and that the second one is unavoidable. They are just careless enough to ignore these horrible outcomes. They are not ignorant, they are indifferent. Had they been ignorant, us radical antinatalists would ought to educate them. But since they are indifferent, educating them is irrelevant. So what we ought to do is educate ourselves, we must look for technological ways to make it impossible for them to procreate. That would not be a theory of justice, but the best practice of it.

References

Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press 1971)

Rawls, J. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press 2001)

What’s Love Got to do With it?

A common comment that antinatalists often hear, despite explaining that their position is a matter of an ethical principle, is ‘so you don’t like babies?’
Beneath this very common question, which is more of a claim, are hiding some of the major problems involved with procreation.

First of all, as argued in a text called Creating a New Person Not Having a Baby, people are not ‘having a baby’ but are creating a new person. People seem to disregard the fact that after a short period of infancy, which many of them are very fond of, comes most of the created person’s life. Creating someone is getting into a lifelong commitment with a person, not with a baby; a person whose parents have no idea what s/he is like, a fact most people are overlooking when talking about liking or disliking babies.

And a more important matter in this regard is that when framing procreation as ‘having a baby’, even the tiny minority of people who do bother to consider possible harms inflicted on their children before creating them, usually focus on harms typical of babies, not on harms typical of an entire human life, such as pain, frustration, fear, loneliness, boredom, disappointment, sickness, rejection, humiliation, injustice, pointlessness, deterioration, anxiety, and death; despite that all are inevitable eventually. Only that they don’t think about what is eventual for babies, but about how adorable they are.

Secondly, what’s love got to do with it? It is not about love. Asking an antinatalist if s/he doesn’t like babies is like asking animal rights activists if they don’t like meat, or asking feminists if they don’t like men. Love has nothing to do with that. Antinatalism is an ethical stand, an ideology, a matter of principle, not of dislike. It is wrong to address such a serious matter as creating new people from the prism of liking or disliking. Creating people is not a hobby. It is the most important decision that would ever be made for another person. Of course, that alone is a very good reason to never procreate, and it is definitely a very good reason not to address it as something that people do if they like children and don’t if they don’t.

Although white people who fought against slavery and against racial segregation, were called ‘Niger Lovers’ in real time, clearly we don’t think that was their motive, or that it is even relevant, but rather that it was ethical principles of liberty and the idea that all people are equal regardless of the color of their skin that motivated them. The same goes for current struggles against racism, and against other forms of discrimination against other groups of society. Like in the case of white activists against slavery about 200 years ago, we still hear homophobes saying especially to straight male activists against LGBT discrimination that maybe they like guys as well, but obviously we know that the real reason behind straight males who participate in demonstrations against LGBT discrimination is that they are dissent equalitarian people who just care about people who are being discriminated against for arbitrary reasons. We don’t need to like discriminated against people to act in their favor, all we need is to hate discrimination. And that’s exactly the reason and motive behind antinatalism. It is not about liking or disliking babies, it is about caring for others, and about hating to see them being harmed by life.

Thirdly, if love has got to do with it, so from one song title to another, if you love somebody set them free.
I am a great dog lover. Every time I see one my mood immediately gets better, and they always make me smile. But that doesn’t make me want there to be many dogs out there so I can see them. If anything, my love for dogs makes me feel the opposite. Because I am aware there are so many miserable and lonely dogs that live in this world, with so many of them developing physical and mental issues (often because of people’s ignorant or cruel insistency to breed kinds of dogs who are prone to many health issues), with so many dogs locked in pounds, with so many killed because they are not adopted, with so many viciously abandoned, with so many tortured in labs, and so many tortured in meat markets, my love for dogs makes me want there to be no dogs, so all these miseries would be prevented from them. Love is supposed to be unselfish and be focused on the other, not the self. So if anything, my love for dogs makes me want to protect them all from the miserable lives many of them would be forced to endure.
It is not about love, not with dogs and not with human babies, but if it was, then the moral imperative should be as the title of one of Julio Cabrera’s books’ – Because I Love You, You Will Not Be Born!

Fourthly, this question reflects how selfish and self-absorbed procreation really is. That is because behind the assumption, that anyone who chooses not to have a baby probably doesn’t like them and anyone who does do, is the concealed yet clear statement that it is all about the creators. The hidden assumption is that if people like something they can go ahead and have it. The option of people thinking that they shouldn’t have everything they like just because they like it, is not part of the premises of the question, otherwise they would assume that at least some people do like babies but don’t think they are permitted to create them.

Behind this question there is a hidden assumption about the relation between liking babies and creating them – people who like babies create them and people who don’t like babies don’t, and that makes creating people some sort of a hobby, something that people are doing if they want to, and don’t if they don’t want to. It discloses how absent the created persons themselves are from the discussion. It reveals how instrumentalizing procreation really is. It implies that creating persons is creating cute gadgets for their creators.
Behind this question, in many senses, there is a latent claim which is that creating people is, in the eyes of anyone who isn’t antinatalist, a potential experience that people can choose to have or not to have, according to them liking or disliking babies, and while ignoring the fact that the created people have no option to choose anything about their own creation. In this text I don’t focus on how ethically wrong it is to impose life on someone, as I have discussed this issue elsewhere. But I do emphasis that the question reveals the selfishness of the creators and the total disregard for the created people. Under the formulation of this pro-natalist question, people are forced with existence – which at least for some of them is expected to be miserable; and to each and every one of them, at least at some point, at least to some extent, would be harmful – because other people, people who are not them, like how cute they are when they start their lives.

Lastly, even if procreation would have created forever babies and not people who start as babies, and even if it was about love and even if people could have somehow ensured the protection of their objects of love and so it wouldn’t be relevant to claim that because we love them they will not be created, and even if we dearly love babies-children-people, as long as we hate suffering we must never procreate, because we can’t prevent our children from causing much of it to many others.

Disliking babies is not the reason behind antinatalism, disliking suffering is. Suffering caused to the created person and by the created person is the motive behind antinatalism. And since both types are inevitable, procreation is always ethically impermissible.

I don’t dislike babies, I dislike procreation. And that is not because procreation creates babies but because procreation creates suffering. The greatest crime of procreation is creating a new and unnecessary unit of suffering, exploitation and pollution, which is added to the already billions of units of suffering, exploitation and pollution. Units of suffering, exploitation and pollution mustn’t exist.
That is the main reason why procreation is morally prohibited and so must necessarily be stopped as soon as possible.

Questioning Julio Cabrera’s Questionnaire – Involuntary Sterilization

The following text is the third and last part of my comments on some of Julio Cabrera’s replies to the questions he was asked in The Exploring Antinatalism Podcast #19 – Julio Cabrera ‘Questionaire on Antinatalism’. In this part I’ll address Cabrera’s reply to the question of involuntary sterilization.

For comments on his replies to questions regarding his general approach to Antinatalism please read part 1. And for comments on his replies to the questions regarding: The moral status of animals, Abortion, EFILism, and Veganism, please read part 2.

Question 16:

“If it were so that the only way to stop people from procreation was something akin to involuntary sterilization, you say that the end justifies the means? Do we have a moral obligation to prevent others from committing the ultimate moral transgression – procreation? If yes, then how? If no then why not?”

Cabrera:

“Involuntary sterilization would be something totally immoral within a negative ethics, in a certain line of argumentation, of course. I have one theoretical line and another practical.
(1). At least within a deontological and not utilitarian ethics such as negative ethics, in order to decide something ethically we have to take into account the autonomies of those involved. In this case we have two autonomies to consider: the real autonomy of the procreators and the conjectured autonomy of the procreated.”

First of all, it is hard to ignore that when Cabrera wants to counter-argue involuntary sterilization then there is a division between the real autonomy of the procreators and the conjectured autonomy of the procreated, but when he wants to counter-argue abortion, then not only the autonomy of the procreated, but the autonomy of the fetus is not conjectured but considered as real and equal to its parents’ autonomy, despite that it is not even conscious yet. If you are baffled by this claim, please listen to his stand regarding abortion in the questionnaire (question 21), or read about it in the second part where I am addressing his anti-abortion view.
But obviously the point is to try and deal with the core of the argument, so I’ll ignore the manipulation and focus on the point he is making here which is that we must consider the autonomy of the people who have a desire to procreate.

The reason this argument is false is first of all since a desire is not an ethical justification. The desire to do something is insufficient as a moral justification to do it even if the desirers are autonomies. Obviously people have an interest to procreate, that’s why they are procreating, but that is a description of our dire reality, not an ethical justification of it.
It is ethically false, if not absurd, to consider the interests in doing something which is basically wrong, as a counter argument for the action’s wrongness. It is balancing the harmfulness of a crime with the interests of the criminals to perform it.
A strong interest to do something wrong doesn’t make it right. Neither does the resulted frustration if the wrong action is prohibited. To claim otherwise is to nullify criminalness, as all that any offender should claim is that by stopping him from committing a crime we are violating his autonomy. The autonomy of every offender would be hurt if they couldn’t continue with their offences, is it a justified reason to let them go on with their crimes? Rapists might feel that their autonomy is hurt if they are not allowed to rape, or if they are caught, is that a reason not to do everything we can to stop them? Can the desire to rape be an argument in favor of raping?
Can people’s autonomy and desire to eat animals be a justification for the torture of the animals they consume? Arguing that all factory farms must be closed down today for the pain and misery they cause can’t be seriously counter argued by claiming that people have a desire to eat meat, eggs and milk, and preventing it from them is not considering their autonomy.

Cabrera argues that:

“Even though it is immoral to procreate from the antinatalist perspective that we assume, there are other perspectives that present reasonable counter-arguments (in fact, Benatar is frequently answering objections because the question is highly controversial).”
Of course this question is highly controversial but not because there are other perspectives that present reasonable counter-arguments, or because it is highly complicated in philosophical terms, but because people want to procreate. It is arguments against selfish desires, social conventions, biological urges, and many other motivations, but definitely not reasonable counter-arguments.
There are no perspectives that present reasonable counter-arguments to antinatalism, there are only excuses that present counter-motivations to antinatalism.

The desire of people to procreate is morally wrong and therefore their autonomy can’t be weighed, not to mention in an equal manner, against the harms forced on the procreated.

Cabrera is aware that the only way to justify the refusal to impose on procreators the prevention of their immoral desire to procreate is by arguing that it is not necessarily immoral. Since if it is immoral, then it is morally justified to ignore the autonomy of the criminals and impose a prevention of their crimes just as it is in other cases of immoral actions such as torture, rape and murder. Therefore he makes the following move:

“If we have the right not to respect the autonomy of the murderer when he is about to kill someone, why would we not have the right to not respect the autonomy of the procreator when he is about to generate someone? I reply that in the case of existing people, we can clearly see that the victim of a murderer wants to continue to exist (and if he does not want to – as in the case of assisted suicide – we can also know this). But in the case of non-existent people, antinatalists assume uncritically that the non-being wants certainly to continue not to exist.”

By claiming that in the case of procreation, as opposed to murder, there is room for speculation, Cabrera states that he is not really sure about his claims regarding the immorality of procreation.
It might be the case that he thinks that procreation is not a serious crime as murder, but that would go against many of his other claims, including ones he has made along the questionnaire, and definitely ones that he made in the book A Critique of Affirmative Morality. For someone whose antinatalism is so heavily based on the harm of mortality, I would expect him to argue that not only is procreation a crime as serious as murder but actually is a type of murder. And since when he talks about mortality he is not only arguing that it is a harm because everyone must die, but because everyone starts dying when they are born, procreation is supposed to be consider by him even worse than murder as it is a slow structural murder. It would have made sense for him to claim that since people are in a constant state of dying then procreators are in a constant state of murdering. But instead of making claims which are accordant and consistent with his other claims, he insists on abruptly claiming that antinatalism is speculative.

For anyone who is less familiar with Cabrera’s other stands, here is a representative sample taken from his book A Critique of Affirmative Morality:

“Even we do not know, for example, whether they will enjoy traveling, working or studying classical languages, we do know they will be indigent, decadent, vacating beings who will start dying since birth, who will face and be characterized by systematic dysfunctions, who will have to constitute their own beings as beings-against-the-others – in the sense of dealing with aggressiveness and having to discharge it over others – who will lose those they love and be lost by those who love them, and time will take everything they manage to build, etc.” (p.54)

And one taken from his article Negative Ethics:

“To come into being is to be ontologically impoverished, sensibly affected and ethically blocked: to be alive is a fight against everything and everybody, trying all the time to escape from suffering, failure and injustice. This strongly suggests that the true reason for making someone to come into being is never for the person’s own sake, but always for the interest of his/her progenitors, in a clear attitude of manipulation; radical manipulation indeed because, in contrast with usual manipulation of people already alive, manipulation in procreation affects the very being of the person, and not only some of his/her predicates.”

So Cabrera’s own antinatalist claims aren’t in line with his reply. Neverthelss a serious reply must be made to the argument that “antinatalists assume uncritically that the non-being wants certainly to continue not to exist”, an argument he further develops along his answer accusing antinatalists for easily going from the premise that the world is a bad place, to the conclusion that nobody wants to live in a bad place. And he finds this sequitur controversial:
“If our conjecture about the interests of the non-being is totally rational, it is certain that it would prefer to continue in the same state. But if the conjecture is made on the basis of humans we know, emotions will prevail over reason and the interests of the non-being could be, despite everything, to come into existence. After all, we are recreating the autonomy of the procreated in pure speculative terms, guided by certain philosophical ideas; but there are perspectives guided by other ideas according to which the non-being wants to exist and is asking for it. This, of course, is equality speculative. But how can one unite between two equally conjectural conceptions of the interests of the not being? Pure speculation about the desires of the not being, in the impossibility of deciding between speculations, is strong enough for me not to procreate, but it seems too weak to prevent others from procreating. What is a strong reason for making my own decision may not be strong enough to justify intervention.”

I will ignore, for the sake of the argument, that he seems to ascribe interests to non-beings, and even that like many pro-natalists, he of all people, the philosopher who criticized Benatar’s asymmetry and presented a different and quite unique approach to antinatalism, treats antinatalism as if it is a movement with one argument, let alone one that is ascribing interests to non-existing beings, despite that there are many other reasons why procreation is wrong, and I’ll focus on the speculation issue.
In order to oppose involuntary sterilization Cabrera takes the very long road of arguing first that the parents’ autonomy and desire must be considered despite that procreation is morally wrong (a claim which is addressed above), and that although he thinks that procreation is morally wrong, antinatalism is speculative. The fact that procreation is morally wrong is not speculative because it needs not to be based on conjectural conceptions of the interests of non-existing beings, but on the fact that at least the interests of some created people would be never to have been.
Given that lives which are found not worth living by the ones who are living them, not by antinatalist, are being created all the time, there is nothing speculative about the claim that the interests of at least some created people is that they had never been created. The fact that their creation severely harms them is not speculative but unquestionable. So letting procreation continue despite that it is guaranteed that at least some of the created people would rather never to have been, is actually claiming that forcing some people to endure miserable lives that they wish were never imposed on them, is justified by the desire of other people to procreate.

This argument must not be confused with the common antinatalist risk argument. Although I find it one of the strongest antinatalist arguments, I think there is something misleading in its common formulation. That is since on the global level procreation is not a gamble, it is not a risk, it is absolutely certain that some persons would be forced to live extremely miserable lives. Somewhere in the world, miserable persons are being created. And that fact turns the argument from a risk that some of the created people would be forced to endure horrible lives, to a decision that some of the created people would be forced to endure horrible lives. People who decide to procreate are not only taking a risk on someone else’s life, they also approve and strengthen the claim that the suffering of some is justified because of the desire of others to procreate. The procreators’ autonomy argument entails sacrificing people who would be miserable if procreation is allowed, for the sake of people’s autonomy if procreation isn’t allowed.

So the speculative argument is false, as even if I’ll accept for the sake of the argument that it is speculative whether everyone’s existence is a harm, it is not speculative that if procreation is allowed, miserable lives would inevitably occur.

One might suggest that what we ought to do is weigh the interests of the people who want to procreate against the suffering of the ones who would have miserable lives, but that is a false equivalency. That is since procreation is not only forcing needless and pointless suffering on the created person, but is in fact, first and foremost, forcing needless and pointless suffering on thousands of other sentient creatures, since each person created is hurting thousands of sentient creatures during a lifetime.
Even if we’ll accept for the sake of the argument that it is speculative whether the created person is going to be harmed as a result of its existence, there is nothing speculative about that thousands of sentient creatures would be harmed by the created person.

It is very hard to accurately assess the harms caused by each person since it depends on various factors such as location, socioeconomic status, consumption habits, life expectancy, livelihood, diet and etc., however, regardless of any circumstances, harming numerous others is inevitable.
And the most immediate and prominent harm is caused by what people eat.
Every person has to eat, and every food has a price. Unfortunately, most people are choosing the ones with the highest price – animal based foods.
Each person directly consumes thousands of animals. More accurate average figures are varied according to each person location. An average American meat eater for example consumes more than 2,020 chickens, about 1,700 fish, more than 70 turkeys, more than 30 pigs and sheep, about 11 cows, and tens of thousands of aquatic animals, some directly and some indirectly (as many of which are fed to consumed animals).
Therefore in most cases procreating is choosing that more fish would suffocate to death by being violently sucked out of water, that more chickens would be crammed into tiny cages with each forced to live in a space the size of an A4 paper, that more calves would be separated from their mothers, and more cow mothers would be left traumatized by the abduction of their babies, it is choosing more pigs who suffer from chronic pain, more lame sheep, more beaten goats, more turkeys who can barely stand as a result of their unproportionate bodies, more ducks who are forced to live out of water and in filthy crowded sheds, more rabbits imprisoned in an iron cage the size of their bodies, more geese being aggressively plucked, more male chicks being gassed, crushed or suffocated since they are unexploitable for eggs nor for meat, more snakes being skinned alive, and more crocodiles and alligators being hammered to death and often also skinned alive to be worn, and more mice, cats, dogs, fish, rabbits, and monkeys being experimented on.
Since most humans, more than 95% of them actually, are not even vegans – the most basic and primal ethical decision one must make – procreation is practically letting a mass murderer on the loose.

And it is not that vegan food is harmless. It is much less harmful, but still very harmful. It is impossible to eat without harming someone, somewhere along the way, even when sticking to a vegan, local, organic and seasonable diet. It is impossible to entirely avoid using fertilizers, packages, pesticides, transportation, water, energy, and to avoid producing waste.
For a broader explanation why harming is inevitable please read the text the harms to others, where there is a more detailed information regarding some of the inherent harms of humans, all humans, and regardless of what they eat.

And anyway, a vegan, local, organic and seasonable diet, is relevant for extremely tiny minority of people who care enough to choose the least harmful options at any given time. Even most vegans and environmentalists are not doing that. Most vegans simply consume plant based food, and most environmentalists still hardly connect food with environmentalism. In recent years there is a positive awaking in that area, but still it mostly regards dolphin safe tuna, food’s carbon footprint, bottled water, and avoiding six pack rings.
And of course the vast majority of people are extremely far from even being aware of all of that, not to mention considering it, or even thinking that they should. And that is a very strong reason for forced sterilization, since there is no way to avoid harming others even if everyone tried, and currently the vast majority of people not only don’t want to, but support the exact opposite.

Living on a planet with limited resources, no one can really avoid getting in conflict with others. No one should cause suffering to anyone, but no one can not cause suffering to others. Everything people do affects others, so it is even theoretically impossible to fulfil the most basic ethical requirement – do no harm. And practically, it is far from being the case that people are harming only since and when they cannot do otherwise. I wish people were harming others only for survival reasons. Reality is unfortunately much crueler. People harm, exploit, torture, humiliate, deprive, attack, ignore, abuse and whatnot, for much less essential reasons. People don’t harm others because they have things that they need, but mostly because they have things that they want.

It is interesting that Cabrera has made a rhetorical comparison between procreating and killing, since the two shouldn’t only be compared on the rhetorical level. As aforementioned, in some sense, especially under Cabrera’s notions of procreation and death, procreating is killing as it is creating someone who has to die. And while that maybe speculative and arguable, the fact that every person kills many others during its life is inarguable. People are killing others on a daily basis, mostly to feed themselves but also to cover themselves, to move from place to place, to heat their houses, to build their houses, and practically for most of the things they consume. So even if you disagree with the claim that procreation is murder because it is creating someone who would necessarily die, procreation is murder anyway because it is creating a mass murderer.

Procreation and murder are in fact intertwined. Since as Cabrera mentioned earlier, we have the right not to respect the autonomy of the murderer when he is about to kill someone, we have the right not to respect the autonomy of the procreator when he is about to generate someone, as that someone would necessarily be a murderer.

Cabrera argued that there are two different autonomies which must be considered, of the procreators and of the procreated, but he ‘forgot’ the thousands autonomies that are violated by each created person. Before discussing the autonomy of procreators and procreated, we must consider the autonomy of everyone who would be harmed by each procreation.

Even if we could know the interests of non-existing persons before creating them, we first must consider the interests of everyone who would be sacrificed and otherwise harmed by these persons. We must consider their interests not to be genetically modified so they would provide the maximum meat possible for the to-be born persons. We must consider their interests not to be imprisoned for their entire lives. We must consider their interests not to live without their family for their entire lives. We must consider their interests not to suffer chronic pain and maladies. We must consider their interests not to be deprived of breathing clean air, walking on grass, bathing in water, and eating their natural food. We must consider their interests not to be violently murdered so the to-be born could consume their bodies. We must consider their interests that their habitats won’t be destroyed, and that their land, water, and air won’t be polluted.

Procreation is not only creating a subject of harms and pleasures, but a small unit of exploitation and pollution. Therefore, the question is not is it justified that people would impose harms on another person so they can fulfil their desire to procreate, but is it justified that people would impose immense harm on many others so that they would fulfil their desire to procreate.

The question in point is not is it ethical to take the risk of creating miserable lives, but is it ethical to impose immense suffering on many others so that a truly tiny minority would
experience parenthood. How can it possibly be acceptable to force lives full of suffering on thousands of sentient beings, just so that one unethical preference of would-be parents won’t be frustrated?

But it goes even further than that. What should be weighed against the interests of people who want to procreate is not only the people who would be born into miserable lives, and not only the nonhuman animals who would be harmed by the newborns of the current people who want to procreate, but all the harms, and all the misery, and all the suffering that would ever be caused by humans. The equation is between one generation of people who would sacrifice their desire to procreate, and all the victims of all the procreations that would ever occur.
Human procreation is not only risking “a tiny minority” who might be sacrificed for the sake of people’s desire to procreate, it is ensuring that numerous generations of sentient creatures would be sacrificed for one desire of an extremely tiny minority – one generation, of one species only.
And since people don’t even take seriously the possibility that their own children might suffer extremely, there is no chance they would ever take seriously the certainty that numerous generations of sentient creatures would suffer extremely because of their procreation. That’s why we mustn’t wait until people understand that it is ethically impossible to justify procreation, but do everything we can to make it impossible to procreate, or in other words involuntary sterilization.

However Cabrera argues that:

“Within a negative ethics, the autonomy of procreators, their desire to procreate cannot be ethically justified, as procreation is immoral. But even so, we cannot prevent others from procreating, since at least in an intellectual democracy, people have the right to disagree with the antinatalist theses.”

What Cabrera is saying is that despite that people’s desire to procreate cannot be ethically justified as procreation is immoral, and despite that preventing others from procreating would prevent tremendous misery and imposition from every human that would ever exist, and from every nonhuman that every human that would ever exist would force to endure, since in an intellectual democracy, people have the right to disagree with the antinatalist theses, we cannot prevent others from procreating. That is simply cruel. How can the deprivation of one desire, of one generation only, be seriously compared with the continuance and systematical deprivation of whomever would exist if that one generation is not involuntary sterilized?
Sentient creatures who would exist in the future are not less morally important than sentient creatures who live right now. And sentient creatures who would live in the future infinitely outnumber the ones who are alive today, let alone merely the humans who want to procreate. So giving the current humans who want to procreate the same moral weight as all the creatures that would ever be forced to suffer is a serious case of myopia, speciesism and cruelty.

Cabrera confuses a right to disagree with a right to impose. People may have the right to disagree with the antinatalist theses when it comes to their lives, but they have no right to impose their stands on others, let alone trillions of others. People don’t have a right to impose. And that’s exactly what they are doing when they are procreating. So does involuntary sterilization of course, but that is in order to stop the infinite impositions bound with the infinite procreations that would occur otherwise, it is an imposition to stop the suffering bound with existence. And it is an imposition to prevent one desire, which is totally immoral, and of one generation only, so that all future impositions of who knows how many generations would stop for good.

Imposition is anyway bound to happen. It is either that people would continue to decide for other people that they would exist, generation after generation after generation, and for other creatures that they would have to be exploited, suffer and be sacrificed for the sake of the people they insist on creating, or that we decide for one generation only that they won’t procreate. There is no way around it, decisions are anyway being made for others, the question is will it be only the decision not to procreate and for one generation only, or the decision to feel pain, to fear, to be bored, to be disappointed, to be sad, to be lonely, to be purposeless, to die, to fear dying and many other sources of suffering, and for generation after generation after generation after generation…

Given that the only way to cease the inherent imposition of procreation is with the inherent imposition of forced sterilization, clearly for the long run that resolution holds much less imposition than letting procreation continue on its current horrendous course. The number of individuals who would have to endure imposition of all kinds in the future if it won’t happen, is practically infinite. In fact, even without considering everyone who would ever exist, the number of individuals who endure coercion of all kinds in the present, already defeats the number of people who need to be sterilized.
Objecting involuntary sterilization on the current generation is forcing endless suffering on an endless number of individuals. Imposition is unavoidable, the question is of extent. The imposition involved in involuntary sterilization is for one generation only. The imposition involved in the refusal for involuntary sterilization can last until the sun burns out.

Think about it this way, if one generation of humans had decided that it is wrong to procreate and therefore agreed to sacrifice its desire to do so, that decision would have prevented all the suffering caused by humans from the moment the last person of that generation died. If for example that generation lived in the beginning of 19th century, that decision would have prevented all the suffering that occurred during the 20th century. Two world wars, hundreds of other wars, all the war crimes, all the reeducation camps, the famine in China, the famine in Ukraine, the famine in Japan, the famine in Russia, the famine in India, the famine in Somalia, the famine in Ethiopia, the famine in Mozambique, the famine in Yemen, the famine in Sudan, all the rapes, all the murders, all the tortures, all the concentration camps in Poland, Germany, Cambodia and North Korea, all the diseases, the Holocaust, the ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, the ethnic cleansing in Armenia, the ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia, the ethnic cleansing in Cambodia, all the animal experimentations, all the fishing, all the hunting, all the beating, all the humiliations, all the accidents, all the disappointments, all the frustrations, all the pains, and every second in every factory farm. Can the frustration of one generation, of one species only, seriously be compared with all these atrocities? Of course not. But the human race is far from being moral enough to decide not to procreate, no matter how obvious, essential, unequivocal and urgent it is. The human race is not moral enough to realize that if one of the former generations had made that call then all the atrocities of the 20th century and the ones happening now in 21st century wouldn’t have happened, and that if they would make that call now, all the atrocities of the 22nd century won’t happen. But the human race would never make that call.
Now if it was possible to sterilize that generation in the beginning of 19th century, an action which would have prevented the horrors of the 20th century, for the price of the frustration of the people who existed in the beginning of 19th century only and wanted to procreate, is it even conceivable to consider if it was worth it? Is it even conceivable to consider if it is worth doing now?

Cabrera argues that:

“We would have to come up with a very powerful justification for intervening in the lives all of these people, to prevent them from doing something that we consider to be immoral, but which they consider to be moral or morally neutral. I am not saying that we cannot intervene; I say that in order to prevent others from procreating, we should have a reason much stronger than the reason that leads us to not have children ourselves. Intervention is a very strong action that must be very well justified.”

And I agree. Indeed intervention is a very strong action that must be very well justified, and it is very well justified by the fact that procreation is a very serious crime.
Procreation is a very serious crime because it is forcing on someone else the most important decision in that person’s life.
Procreation is a very serious crime because it is harming someone else without that person’s consent.
Procreation is a very serious crime because it is gambling with someone else’s life.
Procreation is a very serious crime because it is forcing someone into a needless, pointless, absurd, constant chase after meaning in a meaningless, needless, pointless, and absurd world.
Procreation is a very serious crime because it is forcing someone into a needless, pointless, absurd, constant chase after pleasures despite that pleasures are not really intrinsically good but addictive falsehood smoke screen illusions, which trap sentient beings in an endless, pointless and vain seek for more of them. Pleasures are preceded by wants which are the absence of objects desired by subjects. People want because they are missing something. They seek pleasures to release the tension of craving. Craving or wants, are at least bad experiences if not a sort of pain. Pleasures are short and temporary, and compel a preceding deprivation, a want or a need, which is not always being fulfilled, rarely to the desired measure, and almost never exactly when wanted. And even when desires are fulfilled, the cycle starts again.

Procreation is a very serious crime because it is forcing someone into a needless, pointless, absurd, constant chase after happiness despite that according to the “set point” theory of happiness, which many psychologists find convincing nowadays, mood is homeostatic and we all have a fixed average level of happiness. That means that even desirable things which people do manage to obtain, are satisfying at first, but eventually people adapt to them and return to their “set points”. Therefore people usually end up more or less on the same level of wellbeing they were before. That’s why some argue that people actually run on hedonic treadmills.
Procreation is a very serious crime because there is a very realistic probability that a person forced into existence would be miserable. There is not even a theoretical possibility that a person forced into existence won’t be harmed at all. Creating someone who would definitely be harmed and the only variable is to what extent (with the potential of extreme misery), must be morally prohibited. Given that the motives are never the interests of the to-be born person, it is not only morally flawed, it is selfish, egocentric, arrogant, and careless.
Procreation is a very serious crime because the ample evidences that bad experiences are more important than good ones, not only serve as a proof that good experiences are at least not as good as bad experiences are bad (if not proving that bad experiences almost always outweigh the good ones), but how horrible life actually and inherently is. Basically, pain and other negative experiences, increase the fitness of individuals by enhancing their respondence ability to threats to their survival and reproduction. It has a crucial adaptive function. Existing sentient beings are tortured by evolutionary mechanisms which their only point is that additional sentient beings would exist, regardless of any of those beings’ personal wellbeing. It is a pointless, frustrating and painful trap.

Procreation is a very serious crime because it diverts energy, time and resources from persons who already exist and are in need, to those who needed nothing, were deprived of nothing, and harmed by nothing before they were forced into existence.
Procreation is a very serious crime because life is a constant Sisyphean struggle just to survive a life no one chose. Everyone is bound to overcome needless frustrations, disappointments, pains and discomforts.
Procreation is a very serious crime because each bad moment happening in life is unnecessary. Every pain, every sickness, every fear, every frustration, every regret, every broken-heartedness, every moment of boredom and etc. are all needless. They exist only because the person experiencing them exists. They exist because the parents of that person have forced existence on that person.

Procreation is a very serious crime because lives not worth living is not a theoretical possibility, it is a certainty. People whose lives are not worth living would be born, and the chances for that happening are renewed with each procreation. Misery has no quota. The only way to avoid this worse off option is by not procreating.
Procreation is a very serious crime because there is no way to retroactively revoke it, and there is not even an easy and harmless option for someone to end its own existence. Many people are trapped in horrible lives without a truly viable option to end it because they are too afraid to kill themselves, or because they don’t want to hurt the ones who care about them if they do, or are too afraid that if they won’t succeed in killing themselves they would be socially stigmatized in the better case, or coercively hospitalized in a worse one, or harm themselves so severely while trying to kill themselves that they would end up even worse than they were. Trapping people in the impossible situation of not wanting to live but not wanting to kill themselves so not to hurt others or because they are afraid to kill themselves for any of the mentioned reasons, is a very serious crime.
Procreation is a very serious crime because it forces someone to die, and to fear of death for most of one’s life.
Procreation is a very serious crime because it forces someone into an unfair world where the most crucial factor in having a relatively tolerable life is luck. In a split of a second, even relatively happy lives can turn utterly miserable, often by one wrong decision, or even regardless of one’s actions. One can be very responsible, reasonable and diligent, yet utterly miserable as a result of a mistake made by someone irresponsible, unreasonable and lazy. Life is not only pointless but also unfair, arbitrary and fickle.

And finally, more than anything, what makes procreation such a serious crime, is that it is forcing enormous needless and pointless suffering on thousands of vulnerable individuals. While the person created is one morally relevant creature which would be harmed by being created, each person created is hurting thousands of more morally relevant creatures during a lifetime.

Procreation is so harmful, so wrong, so immoral, and such a serious crime, that it is not enough to oppose it theoretically, we must stop it practically.

Humans’ carelessness, even for their own children, and their cruelty in general, are of the strongest reasons why trying to convince people not to procreate is useless, and why we must find ways to stop humans from procreating regardless of their opinion about it. Just as they disregard the opinion of their children, and all of their children’s victims. That is not to teach them a lesson of course, but because it is the only way to stop this never-ending crime.

The billions of sentient creatures who are imprisoned for their entire lives, the billions of sentient creatures who are being genetically modified so they would provide the maximum meat possible for the to-be born persons, the billions of sentient creatures who are being forced to live without their family for their entire lives, the billions of sentient creatures who suffer from chronic pain and maladies, the billions of sentient creatures that can never breathe clean air, walk on grass, bath in water, and eat their natural food, the billions of sentient creatures being violently murdered so the to-be born could consume their bodies, the billions of sentient creatures whose habitats are being destroyed and polluted, the billions of sentient creatures being skinned alive, castrated, burned, poisoned, kicked, dehorned, mounted, chained, experimented on, enslaved, are all a very powerful justification for intervening in humans’ ability to procreate.

We mustn’t count on human morality. It is speciesist and immoral to allow people to decide and to wait until each one of them would understand and act accordingly, while the victims pile up. We must make a decision for the victims’ sake even without the permission of the victimizers.

Procreation is a crime so serious that it shouldn’t be left for humanity to decide upon. It must be stopped and by involuntary means if necessary. And unfortunately it is necessary.

The problems humans are causing are only getting bigger and bigger, and so the solution must be radical and thorough. People are not going to stop procreating out of their own good will.

Preventing suffering from innumerable generations is a moral imperative. Arguing that something is better, surly in this unequivocal case, ethically compels an intervention to make it happen. After all, to stand idle while generation after generation spawns an unimaginable amount of suffering, is complicity. It is very cruel to let the madness continue without doing anything about it.

People will never stop breeding until we make them. We must stop looking for the best antinatalist argument, and start looking for the best way to somehow sterilize them all.

Cabrera’s practical argument against involuntary sterilization goes as follow:

“If this highly theoretical line of argumentation does not satisfy, there is another more pragmatic: in order to implement a systematic policy of non-procreation with powers to practice involuntary sterilization, we will need an enormous centralized power that compels people not to procreate. In the domain of real politics, a totally unconscious sterilization resource is unthinkable; many people would realize that, in this New Antinatalist Order, they are forbidden to reproduce and that could generate a genuine state of antinatalist terror. Here everything happens as with socialism: it is a good cause – based on equality and solidarity – that may have to resort to some type of violence to be implemented.

The instinctive force to procreate is so high that no weak police could contain it. For this, thousands of other immoral actions would have to be committed just to prevent the immorality of procreation. Even if the procedures were soft, they are intrusive and violent, in one way or another.”

Unfortunately I agree that the instinctive force to procreate is so high that no weak police could contain it. And unfortunately it is also so high that no strong ethical argument could ever contain it. That’s exactly why involuntary sterilization is so needed. Because there is no other way that procreation would ever stop.

I also agree that “in order to implement a systematic policy of non-procreation with powers to practice involuntary sterilization, we will need an enormous centralized power that compels people not to procreate”, and that’s exactly why it is the last thing I imagine when I advocate for involuntary sterilization. My vision is of a chemical or biological agent that compels people not to procreate, not a political one.

Hopefully the method for involuntary sterilization would be the least intrusive and least violent as possible, however nothing is more intrusive and violent than procreation. So even if “thousands of immoral actions would have to be committed just to prevent the immorality of procreation”, they are nothing compared with the trillions of immoral actions that would continue to be committed if involuntary sterilization isn’t committed.

The human race is with no proportion the greatest wrongdoer in history. And things are not getting better. And even if they were, they are currently so horrible that the harm of involuntary sterilization is marginal compared with the harms to existing nonhumans, which quantitatively speaking already by far exceed the number of existing humans, not to mention when considering the harms to every nonhuman who would ever be born. There are more nonhuman animals in factory farms at any given moment than there are humans on this planet. For their sake alone involuntary sterilization is utterly justified. The harm to existing people by preventing them from procreating, can’t seriously be compared to the harms to generations upon generations of sentient creatures whose suffering would be prevented in the case of involuntary sterilization.

The answer to the question do we have a moral obligation to prevent others from procreation, depends on who we ask. If we keep asking humans only, then the answer of most would be that we have a moral obligation not to prevent others from procreating, and only a tiny minority would argue differently. But if we ask anyone who would be affected by involuntary sterilization, anyone whom this question is relevant for but is never asked, an absolute majority would unhesitatingly say that there is a moral obligation to prevent humans from procreating by all means necessary.

Cabrera askes:
“What would an antinatalist say if a natalist society – like ours today – decided to apply fertilizing substances to everyone without their consent?”
Probably that inflicting suffering, let alone without consent, is morally wrong, and that preventing the infliction of suffering, even without consent, is morally right.

That question holds a major false equivalence, since forcing people to create suffering is not the same as forcing people to stop creating suffering. And forcing all people to create more and more people, who would cause more and more suffering, to more and more sentient creatures, is not equivalent to forcing much less people not to procreate, so trillions of victims would be spared.

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